

CURRICULUM
PROBLEMS
ENGLISH



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The Modern Teachers' Series

EDITED BY WILLIAM C. BAGLEY

CURRICULUM PROBLEMS

Modern Teachers' Series

WILLIAM C. BAGLEY, *Editor*

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PUBLIC	
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CURRICULUM PROBLEMS	BRIGGS
EDUCATING FOR FREEDOM	SISSON
FUNDAMENTALS IN EDUCATION	BODE
THE IMPROVEMENT OF TEACHING	FREELAND
THE LESSON IN APPRECIATION	HAYWARD
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CURRICULUM PROBLEMS

BY

THOMAS H. BRIGGS

TEACHERS COLLEGE, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

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PREFACE

THOUGH always declared to be important, the curriculum of both elementary and secondary schools has now actually become so. After a long campaign, culminating in an astounding climax during the past short generation, educators of the United States have succeeded in leading the people to provide schooling, usually extended well into the period of adolescence, for practically every boy and girl of the nation. In theory at least, and to a significant extent in practice, they have determined the organization that promises the greatest returns. They have so convinced both parents and children of the desirability of education that the persistence of pupils in schools has reached a point unparalleled in history. They have so improved the training of teachers that methods, especially in the elementary grades, are far in advance of any previously known. Through professional training they have become acquainted with changed conditions in social, economic, and political life and with a new philosophy and psychology of education. There is a consequent conviction that sweeping changes in the curriculum

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are imperative if the schools are to justify themselves as a wise investment by the State that it may perpetuate democracy and promote its own interests or, in other words, that it may make itself a better place in which to live and in which to make a living.

Students of education are at work on the problem as never before in our history. And in every section of the country committees of teachers and administrators, sometimes assisted by representatives of the lay public, are revising or rewriting curricula and courses of study. This evidence of a realization of need and this activity are good. But there is a disquieting note: from all quarters come appeals for expert guidance; and those who approach expertness are fully aware of the present incompleteness of their knowledge and of the fact that the detailed work must, for real success, ultimately be done by those in the field, constantly directed by facts and principles which they understand and accept. A wise student of society¹ has written: "We must warn ourselves that a little of the ready reliance on the expert comes from the desire to waive responsibility, comes from the endless evasion of life instead of an honest facing of it. The expert is to many what the priest is, someone who knows absolutely and can tell us what to do. The king, the priest, the expert have one after the other had our allegiance, but so

¹ Follett, *Creative Experience*, p. 4.

far as we put any of them in the place of ourselves, we have not a sound society and neither individual nor general progress." What is true of society is true likewise of the curriculum.

Substantial progress toward new curricula and courses of study cannot be made until the problem is considered as a whole, with especial attention to features hitherto neglected. In appreciation of this fact, the following pages have been written. First are presented some questions that are believed to be fundamental to any serious study of the curriculum, questions no one of which has as yet been answered. Some of them have not even received serious general consideration. There may be more than twenty-seven such questions; there certainly are so many. Then follow two chapters on phases of life so important, it is believed, that education cannot afford to neglect them longer.

It may reasonably be asked why constructive answers are not also proposed. There are two reasons. First, the intent of the book is primarily to call attention to the seriousness, the magnitude, and the complexity of the task, and to stimulate many to attempt it. Any answers proposed to the questions, answers such as a real student of the subject must to some extent have, are likely to divert the attention of readers from the questions themselves and from the challenges that they imply. It

is not any one student's answers that are needed but, rather, answers that result from the composite contribution of many who, independently, attempt to solve the problems. Second, to many of the questions no satisfactory answers are as yet possible. There must first be understandings, agreements, experiments almost without number. It will doubtless be many years before we are even reasonably satisfied. Indeed, modification of the curriculum must be as unending as are changes in society and in philosophy. But the length and the difficulty of the task is no reason why fundamental matters shall be ignored. In the volume are stated and implied enough challenges to keep research workers and other leaders of education busy for a generation to come. Of them all, truly professional teachers and students of education should at least be aware, so that their own work may be more intelligent and effective.

Many friends — philosophers, sociologists, psychologists, general educators of several sorts, and administrators — have been kind enough to read the following chapters in manuscript or to discuss with the author the principal matters that are presented. Their patience, kindness, encouragement, and valuable criticism are all gratefully acknowledged. Their names are not mentioned lest they be made to seem responsible for what they may not approve.

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T. H. B.

EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION

THE dominant interests of the teaching profession in our country come and go in waves. Thirty years ago, professional interest, as reflected in educational discussions, concerned itself largely with *methods* of teaching. Beginning about 1910 and culminating ten or twelve years later, the *measurement* of educational processes and products held the focus of attention. And now, quite clearly, it is the *materials* of education that constitute the major field of concentration.

How long this latest wave will last and what will replace it when it begins to subside are questions that need not concern us just now. What should concern us is the task of capitalizing in the service of true educational progress the present widespread interest in the curriculum problem. After all, and quite naturally, there is much in every reform movement that is superficial, much that is evanescent, and much, unfortunately, that represents involution rather than evolution. "Fashions" of interest and enthusiasm have their advantages; they also have their dangers. They are peculiarly prone to confuse mere

change with true progress. In connection with the discussion of educational materials there is an especially vital need for fundamental criteria and standards which, in so far as clear thinking can avail us, will insure that we shall be both "progressive" and "right."

In the present volume, Professor Briggs sets forth some of the fundamental questions for which the serious student of the curriculum problem may well strive to find adequate and consistent answers. These answers will be in the nature of basic criteria and standards of procedure in curriculum building. All students will not answer these questions in the same way, but the effort to answer them should bring into sharp relief the outstanding differences which will then need to be reconciled either by experimentation or by reflective synthesis before extensive programs are carried out on a wide scale.

In his concluding chapters, Professor Briggs does well to emphasize those puzzling factors in human conduct which wield so fundamental an influence and yet which are not easy to isolate and classify. Of late years they have been recognized as important educational outcomes, and the generic term *attitudes* has been applied to them to distinguish them from habits, skills, ideas, meanings, and other more explicit and more easily recognized determinants of conduct. The "emotionalized attitudes" are especially signifi-

cant to education, and these Professor Briggs discusses in a most illuminating way.

The book has been prepared with primary reference to the needs of serious students. Happily the number of such students to-day is far from small. Throughout the country they are at work singly and in groups attempting to reduce to comprehensive and comprehensible terms the tangled and perplexing factors that complicate the processes of teaching and learning. To them, we have every reason to believe, the present volume will bring a fresh stimulus to the sober and sustained thought that the selection and organization of curriculum materials both demand and deserve.

WILLIAM C. BAGLEY

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CURRICULUM PROBLEMS

CHAPTER I

MORE FUNDAMENTAL CURRICULUM RESEARCH

THE fundamental problem in education is the curriculum. What should be taught to a large extent determines the organization of our schools, the buildings and equipment, the methods used, and the value of the schools to the community. Always recognized as important, it has in recent years, because of a changed conception of discipline, become paramount. No superintendent, principal, or teacher can proceed far with intelligent plans — indeed, he can hardly begin them — until he has decided what is to be taught. And yet about nothing in education is less with certainty known.

Although the importance of the curriculum has always been recognized, it is only at long intervals that material changes are made in it. One would not go far wrong in asserting that the history of education is written in terms of these changes in subject matter. Modifications of organization, development of methods, and improvement in buildings and equipment,

however important they seem and are at a given time, sink into the background as progress is seen to be marked by subject matter introduced and adapted to recognized needs. It is interesting and instructive to recall the various efforts that have been made to "reform" education and to see how each of them, though primarily involving subject matter, had greater effect on some physical phase. The academy and the junior high school movements, for example, contributed much to educational progress, but the chief matter in which they failed to achieve the ideals of their proponents was in the curriculum.

For the most part curricula are perpetuated by repetition. It is true that teachers of ability, with especial gifts of independence and invention, constantly make minor modifications of what they teach, some of which slowly become a part of general practice. But these modifications one may say are fortuitous and sporadic. Sometimes they are actual regressions from the general stream of progress. If copied by others, it is because of a novelty of presentation, the vigor of their proponents, or the dissatisfaction with intangible results from other practices. A series of minor eddies has been constant, but the stream is so sluggish as usually to appear a pool. A group of teachers or an individual after long labor presents a new curriculum, but seldom in the past have such efforts done much more than rearrange the

elements, leaving the main body of knowledge much as it was. This "new" curriculum is then more or less widely copied, and there is a complacent illusion of progress.

At present there is general concern about the curriculum. The public to some extent, though inadequately, realizes that changes in the school population and the developments of modern life necessitate corresponding changes in subject matter; and professional school people know not only this but also that current practices are far from being in accord with accepted educational philosophy and proved educational psychology.

As a result, more serious and intelligent study is being given to the subject than ever before in the history of education in the United States. A few scholars are devoting themselves almost wholly to researches in this general field; many more are perfecting studies of subordinate problems — such as the frequencies and difficulties of vocabularies — that furnish substantial contributory materials; still others are developing for special subjects vastly improved courses of study, parts of which slowly but certainly find their way into textbooks; while committees in several states and in numerous cities are by revision or rewriting producing curricula and courses of study which they believe are more nearly suited to the abilities of their pupils and the needs of society.

This current interest and activity, manifested by recent numerous publications in books and in educational magazines, began in the elementary and normal schools, where the problems are relatively simple though extensive and profoundly difficult. It is now extending to secondary schools, largely because of the recent inclusion of a vast army of heterogeneous youth, and to some of our colleges.

Though promising and commendable, these efforts cannot be really successful, however, unless they are based on answers to a number of fundamental questions, questions which are far too frequently ignored. It is the purpose of this chapter to present these questions, that the difficulty of the curriculum problem may be realized and that workers may be directed to the importance of securing answers. It is recognized that every school has its immediate curriculum problems; a decision must be made, even though with inadequate data, as to what shall be taught next semester. This volume contributes little to aid here. With such information as we have, some real advance can be, and is likely to be, made over the traditions. But more important is the direction that the larger changes are to take through prolonged, profound, and progressive research. The material in this volume is presented to help stake out the course that will be followed.

A consideration of the following twenty-seven ques-

tions, the importance of which will, it is thought, be obvious, makes it clear that some of them cannot yet be answered with any degree of positiveness or finality. And yet they must be answered in some way before education can give the satisfaction to society that all expect of it — indeed, for which it is supported. It should prove helpful for all who are concerned with curriculum revision, whether research workers or classroom teachers, to know just what the fundamental questions are and which of them must be decided arbitrarily on the basis of the best judgment of an individual or of a group. It is obvious that different philosophies, whether applied to government or to social relations, will result in different answers. For a number of these there are no “authorities.” It should prove helpful, too, to know which questions must be referred to facts, experimentation, or psychology. If the facts are not known, they may be sought. Even though experiments involve great labor and inconvenience, they may be carried through if the value of their results is demanded; and psychology may be definitely challenged to make practical contributions to meet imperative needs.

The questions are presented with brief comment on each. Some of these questions involve the most profound philosophy of education and of life; all are important. Set down thus briefly, they may easily

fail to impress one as they deserve to do; on the other hand, they may bewilder one who realizes their far-reaching implications. The casual reader will wonder why answers are not proposed. There are two reasons: one is that for many of the questions no satisfactory answers exist; the other is that the purpose of the presentation is not to advocate any theory of education that the author may hold, an advocacy that might easily confuse the issues, but rather to reveal the importance, the extent, and the complexity of the curriculum problem, so that an intelligent comprehensive attack may be made by a large number of educational workers.

1. What are the desired ends of education? — There are scores, perhaps hundreds, of statements of the desired ends of education. Critically examined, they fall into two general classes: the figurative or rhetorical ("What sculpture is to the block of marble, education is to the human soul") and those that attempt to be practically directive ("Education is adaptation to life"; "Education should lead to social efficiency"). The former may sound attractive, but it is doubtful if they ever modified one single detail of the curriculum. Their only value, if they have any, is to fire the imagination or to stimulate the will of a worker.

The directive statements, one can easily see by consideration, differ not only in their emphasis and com-

pleteness but also in their fundamental conceptions. Books have been written to explain and support this, that, or the other conception; but no complete philosophy is held in common or even professed by a majority of educators. It is obvious that a structure must be determined largely by its foundations. It is only common sense to decide what sort of building is desired before laying out the foundations. Without agreement on this fundamental matter one of two curriculum results is inevitable: one who does not decide in his own mind what his foundations are can only tinker with details, the sum of which can never make a satisfactory unity; one who does lay his foundations first, without securing the approval of the majority of his fellows, will erect a structure which they will assuredly disapprove — if they comprehend it. It is too much to hope that all curriculum workers in our democracy will agree on a fundamental philosophy; it is not too much to expect that those who work coöperatively shall prove wherein they hold different views or, what is more important, wherein they agree. If they can unite on one part of the structure, which in all probability is larger than ordinarily suspected, so far the work can be pushed forward to economic common use.

One of the most discouraging phases of the whole problem of curriculum making is the fact that few workers in the field can or will think continuously in

terms of general principles. It is relatively easy, as many theorists have found, to secure academic, even apparently enthusiastic, approval of a thesis or general principle, either because it is sound or because there is no superior one presented in opposition; but the consistent application of it to the selection and organization of subject matter is quite another thing. It is just here that education seriously needs leaders — leaders who hold a sound comprehensive philosophy of which they can convince others, and who can direct its consistent application to the formulation of appropriate curricula. In fairness it must be admitted that failure here is due only in part to inability to apply a philosophy. A most cogent deterrent is the probability that no philosophy consistently applied would lead to anything nearly like our present practices, especially in secondary schools, and all shrink from “impracticable” proposals. The willingness to compromise in order to secure some degree of progress is, of course, wise; but the yielding to habit merely because of convention is without doubt the stronger reason.

It is postulated, then, first of all, that any individual or any group seriously working on the curriculum must begin with the acceptance of a directive statement of the desired ends of education. This statement should be clear, adaptable, and pragmatic — clear that it may be understood; adaptable in the

sense that it will permit of modification to meet needs that are temporary, individual, or peculiar to a locality; and pragmatic in that it furnishes not only guidance but also drive to decide minor questions as they arise.

2. What is "the good life"? — An analysis of any reasonable directive statement of the desired ends of education leads ultimately to the question of what constitutes what Plato called "the good life," or what later philosophers call the man of character, of social efficiency, of balanced effectiveness, and the like. This question demands first of all an inventory of the approved activities of men and women who are selected as good citizens. Activities are emphasized because attitudes and skills are of value only as they are manifested in action. The list of actions resulting from this inventory will probably need to be supplemented by a list of activities that are desired, though they may not be found even in the composite good citizen. This proposed plan combines the advantages of job analysis with those of expert judgment.

Such an analysis of "the good life" reveals a number of emotionalized attitudes, factors which the curriculum of formal education has usually neglected. Because they condition the reception, interpretation, and application of facts, and because they indirectly as well as directly determine and drive to action, they are of great importance in character; and consequently

we must be assured that they are considered by the curriculum, formal or informal. Besides these, which are individual, there are shown by the analysis unrationalized attitudes and actions, called *mores*, of groups of various sizes. The emotionalized attitudes and the mores are so important and so generally neglected as responsibilities of education that they are discussed at some length in Chapters II and III.

Again the result cannot be satisfactory to all, for the selection of representative good citizens would vary with the research workers. In some matters — *e.g.*, in social and economic relations — it is easy to see that as the subject matter becomes of value it becomes dangerous, for here ideals differ greatly and strong emotions support, if they do not supplant, intellectual disagreements. But it should be obvious that such an inventory would yield a set of objectives far more substantial and directive than vague generalities. However much judgment would modify the list by subtractions or additions, workers would have clearly in mind, as they do not now have, a large number of activities which they have decided are characteristic of men and women whom they have selected as representative of what they wish the next generation to be. The details common to several lists should furnish the raw material of the curriculum — to be evaluated and so distributed and organized that means of securing the desired activities may

be invented or devised. Here is a fertile field for research work.

3. To what extent is it desired that education shall modify the character and actions of future citizens? — From the earliest times onward it has been asserted that education is to affect character and actions resulting from it, but only when it actually does so is the question as stated pertinent. Now “for the first time in history, as I see it,” writes Dean Russell,¹ “a social democracy is attempting to shape the opinions and bias the judgment of on-coming generations. The urge to self-perpetuation may be no less strong in a democracy than in other forms of government, but its realization under democratic control is exceedingly difficult. A thousand American school boards may make more noise, but their voice is not so distinct as that of a Prussian *Kultusminister*. But we have school boards which employ teachers, determine what shall be taught, and pass judgment on the outcome. Public opinion, back of school boards, fixes our educational creed and controls all our undertakings. Any other control, even state control except within limits, is inconceivable while we maintain our present ideals of American democracy.”

Concerned by the possible modifications of character and consequent actions are the individual, the family immediately responsible for his personal welfare, the

¹ *Report of the Dean of Teachers College, 1925.*

groups with which he will have his closest contacts, and the State, which provides the education and to the welfare of which every citizen positively or negatively contributes. Though the individual as a rule is too immature and the social, economic, and political groups are too far removed and uncertain in their composition to participate actively in formulating an answer, the family and the State can and do in varying degrees contribute. The family has certain inalienable rights; the State others. But the former is too narrow in its view, too selfish and prejudiced; the latter in its representatives is too uninformed of pertinent peculiar facts and frequently is inconsiderate of its own needs and requirements. Moreover, it is uncertain whether the State shall be defined as the local group or a larger one, even embracing the entire nation. What is the unit of "public opinion"?

Many conflicts are here possible. To a great extent, it may be assumed, the interests of the individual and of the State are identical. It may be assumed further that the representatives of the individual, when they are not ignorant or unconcerned, are on many matters in agreement with representatives of the State as to most ends and means. But when they are not, which opinion, desire, or demand shall be dominant? The question involves fundamental conceptions of sociology, government, and philosophy; consequently the answer is not easy. It may be pos-

sible, however, through adequate consideration, to arrive at some understanding that will give direction to discussions leading eventually to agreement.

Although the State, in many instances by statute or other requirements, has determined some parts of the curriculum, it has usually done so in very general terms (*e.g.*, reading, hygiene, etc.), leaving the details to its representatives. Moreover, it has been very generous — perhaps too much so for its own good — in permitting interpretations of its requirements and deviations, notably in electives, for individuals. Parents have often made requests or demands for changes in the curriculum — additions, exclusions, and modifications — and these have been granted or denied without sufficient consideration of the principle involved.

More important than this influence has been that of active minority groups, who for one reason or another have thought that some new subject should be introduced into the curriculum. To them must be credited agriculture, home economics, business training, health education, safety training, instruction aimed against the use of stimulants and narcotics, and many other subjects or topics that are now generally taught. In some of our states, as a result of the activities of minority groups, there are statutes requiring as many as twenty different subjects, or curriculum units, to be taught in the public schools. To

most of these there has been little opposition, because of a general recognition, when considered at all, that the proposed topics are in themselves good. But how good? It is not rational to consider any topic "in itself." If introduced into the curriculum, it will in all probability displace something else. Which is the better? and for whom — the individual, the active minority group, or the State as a whole? Only when all pertinent facts are considered should judgment be made. And sound judgment is impossible until the hierarchy of rights of individual, local groups, and State has been determined.

The activities of minority groups in influencing the curriculum have up to this time probably been beneficent. But there are those who realize possibilities here of danger. "The trend of public opinion in matters educational is part and parcel of the tendency of the times to shape conduct by legal enactment. Whether we like it or not, some school boards will sit in judgment on history texts and some will bar out modern science. The war taught us that German could be eliminated from our schools. Who knows what labor unionists, or chambers of commerce, or Biblical fundamentalists will insist on next? I foresee trouble enough to keep us from stagnation. Once a homogeneous group, bent on having its own way, gets the notion that the schools can be used to promote its particular tenets, that group will surely seek to shape

educational procedure. As soon as one group succeeds in influencing school affairs, some other group will rise in opposition and demand to be heard. This is no idle speculation: parties and sects and unions are even now contending for preferment in a way embarrassing to those who look to the larger good. The most hopeful sign is that contending groups may neutralize each other, thus giving the teacher a chance to work out his own salvation.”¹

Seldom is opposition made by the public to the inclusion or retention in the curriculum of either the so-called tool-subjects or of the cultural subjects, like modern languages, or of subjects, like mathematics, in which facts are obvious or demonstrable. But trouble is possible even here. French may be so taught as to affect the attitudes of youth toward the people of France; and frequently “facts” are capable of conflicting interpretations, and their application may cause attitudes and actions different from those common to parents or other citizens. Trouble is inevitable when one group urges teaching that results in ideals, attitudes, prejudices, or practices that conflict with the mores of others, especially with the mores that strongly involve the emotions — for example, religion, social relations, and property. The conflict is joined in earnest when, instead of facts, theories or hypotheses are proposed.

¹ James E. Russell, *loc. cit.*, p. 8.

It is futile to argue that "facts should be impartially presented." In practice no such thing is possible, either in elementary or in secondary schools. Even the best teachers who consistently and conscientiously attempt to be impartial inevitably by their selection, organization, interpretation, and application of facts determine the conclusions that the young draw from them. And concerning many matters pupils are too immature to make sound judgments. When facts are not interpreted and applied, little effect on character or on action is probable.

"Some would avoid controversial questions," says Dean Russell.¹ "But children who read the newspapers, listen to the radio, participate in political campaigns, and engage in sectarian controversies cannot be muzzled. A labor strike is not a negligible matter to those engaged in it or to those who suffer its consequences. If the facts bearing on such problems are not presented by competent teachers to those who want to know, information of some kind will be gotten somewhere out of which opinions affecting society for good or ill will be quite permanently fixed. It is idle to say that the most important subjects affecting social welfare are too abstruse for adolescent minds, when pupils in our grammar and high schools are presented daily with situations, national and international, which call for a knowledge

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 9.

of history and geography, science and economics, political economy and sociology. Some problems of trade and transportation, of capital and labor, of political policy and international relations must be faced in the modern school."

The importance of this issue is further realized when a specified child rather than the generalized one is considered. Suppose the school should draw up a clear statement, made definite by numerous concrete illustrations, of the ends that it proposes to attain — ends affecting the emotionalized attitudes and actions — character, in short — of the child. Suppose further that it presents this to the parent and shows how it intends the child to feel and to act regarding the observation of the Sabbath, Soviet Russia, free trade, the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution, "fundamentalism" in religion, the social equality of blacks and whites, birth control, local political parties and practices — to enumerate only a few items. What attitude will, should, and can each parent take, especially if the attitudes and actions proposed are contrary to his own and also to the ideals which he professes with all his intellect and his emotions? It will be exceedingly difficult for the parent who holds what he believes to be superior standards to yield to "the will of the majority," especially if he believes that will to be formed without adequate and wise consideration of all the factors involved in the matter.

The fact that numerous subjects and topics have been and are required by law is evidence that the people have tacitly accepted what the courts have repeatedly held — that in matters of education the State is sovereign. But when the matter is fully considered it is easily seen that previous tacit acceptance does not mean that the issue will not again become unsettled whenever parents truly understand and appreciate what ends the new education is seeking to effect. Certainly all will agree that before the State shall prescribe this or withhold that element of education, it shall clearly realize the rights of the individual and of his societal group, and also that it shall definitely decide what it wishes contributed to its own perpetuation and progress.

We are brought face to face, then, with the original question. If it be admitted that education increasingly seeks to modify character and actions, and that it is likely in some degree to be successful, we must ask: 1. Who shall determine the kind and amount of modification that shall be sought? 2. In what matters? 3. What rights of the other parties concerned must be considered and conserved? Unless these questions are answered with some degree of finality, education in order to avoid constant protests and obstacles from individuals must tend toward the teaching of the facts and theories which, though true in themselves, are least relevant to life and

are least likely to affect it either one way or another.

4. **For which of the approved ends is the public school responsible?** — This question has two phases: one concerning formal education by schools, and the other concerning only the schools supported by public taxation. To answer the former phase it is necessary to ascertain, first, which of the desired ends previously set up have been reasonably secured by home training, by incidental social contacts, and by other types of informal education; and, second, which of them may safely be left to a continuance of this informal education or to other agencies like the church, Boy and Girl Scouts, and other similar organizations. With every child education of great importance, for good or for ill, is continuous outside the school. Its nature and its achievements should be more consciously and formally recognized than they commonly are. Its variations in individuals as well as in communities necessitate curricula of wide differences. Some attention, fortunately increasing with great rapidity, is now being paid to phases of desirable education that previously have existed only outside the school, and they are being introduced as extra-curricula activities. If they are worthy and are the province of the school, they should be made a definite part of the curriculum. It is unwise to leave them to chance interests and the competition of less valuable requirements, and it is

unfair to ask teachers of enthusiasm and fidelity to contribute to their promotion time and energy for which they are not paid.

The latter phase, concerning the responsibility of the public school, raises the question of whether or not there are ends which are desirable for the individual or for a small group but which do not contribute sufficiently to the welfare of the larger social group to make them the concern and responsibility of the State. On this matter opinions differ. One side holds that whatever is good for the growth of the individual is good for the State, an opinion that probably has the weight of practice in its favor. The other maintains that the welfare of the State has never in the United States received the consideration in curriculum making which, in view of the fact that society as a whole pays the bill, it deserves; that nothing is justified in the curriculum that does not promise a return of good to the social group that supports the school. Curriculum workers need to make a decision as to which side is right and then, if they agree with the second contention, to check their inventory for items that should be referred to the responsibility of parents or guardians. Certain phases of religious instruction may be cited as one of many mooted details.

5. What details of subject matter can contribute to the desired ends of education? — The selection of objectives of education, the plan of the structure, must

be followed, of course, by provision for the means, the materials. A confusion of means with ends, or rather an emphasis on means with a neglecting or ignoring of aims, is one of the commonest weaknesses in curriculum making, as well as in teaching. Desired action is impossible without necessary knowledge, but knowledge alone will not inevitably lead to action — not frequently enough, in fact, to justify the cost in money, effort, and time. If details of knowledge are selected and presented, however, in terms of attitudes, habits, and other determinants or patterns of action, the program promises much more effective returns. It will keep before pupils and teachers alike the real ends of education and the relations of all details to them; it will give meaningful values to details of subject matter and of method; and it will emphasize the necessity of measuring results not merely in terms of knowledge or contributing skills, but rather in terms of disposition and ability to act properly in given situations. Applied to courses of study and to textbooks, this principle would lead to revolutionary changes, especially in secondary schools.

6. What basis should be used for the selection of details of subject matter? — Here again are two rival contentions. One timorous of individual or even group judgment advocates a beginning with what empiricism has developed and tradition has perpetuated. It contends that nothing could have survived

years of use without having values, which it is incumbent on us to find and preserve. It would begin with what we have and seek improvement through modification of details.

The other, critical or even contemptuous of tradition, which, it is claimed, continues what may or may not once have been sound long after changed conditions have made it futile or relatively of small value, advocates a beginning with ideals, principles, and an agreed educational philosophy. With this as a starting point it would erect its educational structure. Into this it would build novel practices as well as all of the old that can be justified; but nothing should be included that cannot be justified both absolutely and relatively.

Practice is undoubtedly in accord with the former program — not, however, because curriculum makers have decided that it is the better, but because it is the easier. It does not always involve the application, or even the acceptance, of theoretic criteria, as its advocates demand. Attempts to follow the second program, usually in small units of subject matter, result in such unconventional courses or are so severely handicapped by lack of materials that they have had little permanent result. Real progress demands a definite answer to this question and a consistent application of the program adopted, whether it be one or the other, or a compromise of both.

7. What should be the content of each course of study? ¹ — When it has been decided what unit for organization shall be adopted, the approved details of subject matter leading to desired ends must be distributed under the most appropriate heads. In numerous instances there will doubtless be a contention by two or more units for the same details. (For example, science and civics may each list details concerning the contagion of disease.) Such common demands require a decision to prevent duplication and furnish an opportunity to provide for correlation between courses. The movement a generation ago to effect correlation, though it did leave some impress on practice, to a large extent failed not because it was wrong in theory but because it necessitated so large a conception and so much labor that it degenerated into petty, forced, and ineffective relations. Each collection will be the raw material for a course of study. In all probability each one will contain more material than can possibly be taught; but it is necessary to make this comprehensive grouping before it is possible intelligently to decide on relative values of

¹ Hitherto *curriculum* has been used to indicate the entire corpus of educational materials. A *course of study* means the organization of material into a unit for presentation, as "a course of study for first year English" or "a course of study for the ninth grade in civic duties." Later *curricula* will be used to indicate a coherent grouping of courses of study leading to some larger goal, as "a music curriculum."

details, on organization within the courses, or on the amount of time that can be allowed in a curriculum to any course of study, either elective or required.

The same criteria that have been approved for the inclusion of the material of the curriculum will naturally be applied when courses of study are developed. But more than that is necessary. Details closely related by content and purpose must be grouped according to purpose or objective, to the age and ability of pupils, and to economy of presentation. These tentative courses of study will then afford information that will make possible an answer to Question 12. After this and other subsequent questions are answered, each course of study must be revised and put into a form for further modification as its defects become manifest in practice and as needs or new conditions develop.

8. What should be the plan of organization of the approved details of subject matter? — The conventional organization is by subjects — English, mathematics, music, and the like. The main objectives are given by the Committee on the Reorganization of Secondary Education as health, a command of the fundamental processes, vocational effectiveness, civic responsibility, the wise use of leisure time, home membership, and ethical character. Other similar analyses have been made. One such must be adopted by curriculum workers, and under each division must be

placed all the details of the inventory of desirable traits and all the means that contribute directly to it. Quite possibly a combination of the conventional subjects with the other categories of objectives may prove a desirable compromise. But no independent curriculum making can be effective without the adoption of some plan of organization that promises to be inclusive, articulating, and economical for subsequent teaching.

9. What are the responsibilities of each unit of the school organization? — Our educational systems are generally organized, as is well known, into seven- or eight-year elementary schools, four-year high schools, and colleges, or into six-year elementary schools, three-year junior high schools, three-year senior high schools, and colleges. The functions and responsibilities of each unit should not only be well understood, but they should determine every detail of the work introduced into the curriculum. The fact is, however, that there is neither a common agreement as to what each unit should accomplish nor is there generally, if anywhere, a consistent use of approved functions as criteria for the introduction of subject matter.

Theorists have proposed plausible functions for each unit of the educational system; but they are seldom cited by curriculum makers and far less often used. Bonser, for example, says that the elementary

grades should furnish the education necessary in a democracy for all, regardless of sex, social status, or future vocation, and that it should integrate pupils by means of common knowledge, ideals, and attitudes. But one searches in vain for even an individual enumeration of the details necessary for all normal citizens, though some progress has been made in special fields, or of the desirable elements of integration. Briggs and others¹ have proposed purposes peculiar to the junior high schools; but to no detail of the reorganization has less attention been paid when new curricula and courses of study are devised. The lack of agreement concerning the functions of secondary and higher education can be realized not only by reading the collection of statements presented by Koos² but also by studying syllabi and textbooks. So long as this condition exists we must have only curriculum tinkering, which brings some improvement, it is true, but relatively of small significance when compared with the ideal.

What is vitally needed is an agreement by a considerable number of the ablest thinkers in education on the functions and responsibilities of each unit of our school organization and then a selection from the inventory of means leading to desired activities of those that are most likely to contribute to each approved end.

¹ W. A. Smith, *The Junior High School*, pp. 153-204.

² *The Junior College*, pp. 354-376.

10. What psychology has a bearing on the curriculum? — Psychology has advanced far more rapidly during the past generation than has its application to the curriculum. Besides some disputed theory, there are many accepted facts that must be considered and applied to the making of a general program and to the selection of details of courses. Most important of these facts are those relating to formal discipline, to transfer, to individual differences, and to the laws of learning and retention. In addition to these there are numerous other facts and well-supported theories that urge various modifications of curriculum practice. All these are clearly presented in modern textbooks on psychology. The application to curriculum problems — the organization of materials as well as their selection — must be made more by classroom practitioners and philosophers than by laboratory psychologists.

11. What should be the distribution of the details of a course of study? — The judgment of teachers based on experience now almost wholly determines the answer to this question. But more than this is needed. It is possible — indeed it is the practice of skilled teachers — to adapt a topic to the capacities of a class. *The Ancient Mariner* may be taught early in the grades or in the senior high school; some elements of physics may be taught in the seventh grade or differently in the twelfth. Decision has to be made on the basis of some more or less clearly stated set of

principles when is the best time for presenting details of subject matter leading to desired activities, and the more definitely such principles are understood and applied, the better. For example, is it better for certain topics of civics to be taught in an elementary way to all pupils while they are still held in school by the laws of compulsory attendance, or deferred for more comprehensive consideration with those pupils who survive to the senior year of the high school? Would it not be better, as a further example, to defer for one year the usual ninth-grade algebra? The arguments for this are that those pupils who drop out of school would lose little, elementary algebra being a propaedeutic tool subject; those who remain to elect it would be a more select group than at present, with an additional year of maturity; and in the remaining three years all the necessary or conventional mathematics could be presented. Of course the relative persistence of pupils in different communities or schools would affect all decisions as to the placement of variable topics. Accepted principles in a philosophy and the judgment of unbiased educators should determine such matters rather than the opinion of an individual textbook author, of a "specialist," or of a single teacher.

But there are phases of this question that must be decided by experimentation rather than by opinion. Which topics and what phases of them can be comprehended, learned with the greatest economy, ap-

plied, and retained by pupils at various stages of their development? There is evidence, for example, that children who begin arithmetic in the third grade know more of the subject at the end of the sixth grade than do similar children who begin the subject in the first grade. Many carefully guarded experiments of this kind are needed.

Then there is the problem of the articulation of courses. Granted that a topic can be learned equally well in any one of three years, when should it be taught, most effectively to be used in another subject? Phases of mathematics applied to physics are an illustration. Far more economy is possible in articulating courses of study than has up to this time been provided for.

12. What is the relative importance of each course of study? — Only when tentative courses presented in considerable detail are considered can judgment be intelligently made as to the time allowance that is reasonable for each one in a curriculum. The more common practice of allocating so many years of so many periods a week to a course of study without a knowledge of its proposed content has nothing to justify it. When this is done there is an assumption of the content of courses, an assumption usually that it will be practically what it has been in the past.

Even when provisional courses are prepared and carefully considered a decision as to the assignment

of time must be based wholly on judgment. Unfortunately there is no authority for what constitutes "harmonious development" of a "well-rounded citizen of a democracy." We do not find in the history of education a record of any joint consideration by representative philosophers of this matter; and yet a decision must be made by every individual or group of individuals responsible for the curricula of a school. If there is belief in the ameliorating effects of education, there should be given to this distribution of the time possible for a curriculum the best judgment of our ablest thinkers, students of life as well as of education, agreed as to objectives, thoroughly informed as to proposed and possible subject matter, and respectful of, though not unduly influenced by, tradition. Even with these characteristics they must have answers to a number of subsequent questions before they can make an allotment of time satisfactory for practical purposes.

13. What is the best distribution of the time allotted to a course of study? — The most common practice in the United States is to assign to a subject one period a day for a semester or a year until the available time is consumed. ("Minor" subjects are often "fitted in" to complete the required number of hours a week.) These are such large units of time that some subjects are probably padded with details of relatively less value than those of another subject

which are crowded out, or else details not naturally or economically belonging to a subject are included because of its time allotment. In so far as this is found to be true, it may seem wise to make more numerous divisions of the work of a year, three or more, or else to assign to subjects fewer than five periods a week.

In European schools it is a common practice to continue some subjects two or even six years with one, two, or more recitations a week. In fact the secondary schools seldom if ever drop a subject once introduced. Everything taught is continued long and applied frequently enough to stamp it in. Contrast our one-semester or one-year fragments, our two-year foreign language courses, all dropped after a fair beginning and, to a large extent, forgotten because they are not sufficiently overlearned or utilized for the satisfaction of further needs. From one point of view the short units proposed for consideration may be wise in that they would afford some training in numerous fields before pupils are eliminated; from another they may be unwise in that they would give to these pupils a smattering of the subject without a mastery. The nature of the material presented would largely determine a decision as to which procedure is the wiser.

There is another phase of the question, however, that requires results from experiment, which we

do not now have, before a decisive answer can be made. Which gives the better degree of permanent mastery, concentration or distribution of time? Measurement should be made of the results, both immediate and after various lapses of time, from, say, 200 hours devoted to a subject in one year and from the same amount of time distributed over two or more years. Some teachers cite the laws of distribution of time for the effectiveness of retention, while others complain of the loss due to "warming up" after the lapse of three or four days. No one knows what the net of good results is. But we should know.

14. What is required by law or by other outside agencies? — In a number of states there is a requirement, statutory or constitutional, of subjects that must be taught in either elementary or secondary schools or in both. State departments of education also make requirements, which are enforced by the power of withholding grants or approval for certifying privileges, or by the cogency of official influence. There are also requirements by colleges for admission and by other agencies for various purposes. Compliance with the requirement that a subject be offered is in the smallest schools equivalent to requiring it of all pupils, for as every teacher is occupied every period, there is no possibility of electives. Curriculum makers must know what all these requirements are and decide which of them must be met and which

others reasonably should be, without undue sacrifice of accepted educational principles.

The fact that most of these requirements have been made without proper knowledge or even a reasonable consideration by experts of all the elements involved adds a responsibility to educators for seeking such modifications as they can prove wise. Complacent acceptance of traditional requirements, either of those that never have passed the test of reason or of those that no longer do, is not evidence of a professional spirit.

15. How long should education be continued at public expense? — The problem a short time ago was, and in some communities still is, how to retain children in school. But the fundamental question has never been considered on its merits and answered so that a definite position is intelligently held. Education has too often been the result of a traditional and growing sentiment: education is good; therefore get and give as much as possible. With the recent tremendous increase in the persistence of pupils in schools, with the necessarily attendant increase of costs, the question demands a reasonable answer. Without it we are courting and encouraging disaster, which may at any time result from a popular decision based on ignorant and partisan agitation. It depends on the fundamental conception of the purposes of public education — whether the State

is making a long-term investment or furnishing a benevolent and paternal benefaction — on the kinds of education offered, and on the capacities and the industry of the attending pupils. It involves, too, the matter of compulsory attendance, of the organization of schools, and of required and elective courses. At one end is the problem of encouraging, if not of compelling, certain pupils to remain in school, with the correlative economic provision for the possibility; and at the other the deciding that certain other pupils, persisting beyond the point of reasonable returns to themselves or to the State, must leave and either go to work or provide at their own cost further education for themselves.

16. What is the optimum length of the school day and year? — Practice in these two matters varies widely throughout the United States. The school day is sometimes as short as five clock-hours or less, and sometimes as long as seven or eight. The year ranges from two hundred days downward. And yet pupils from nearly all schools are expected to make the same progress. Involved in the problem of economy of instruction and the amount and quality of study by pupils is that of health. Extensive experimentation is needed with varied lengths of day and year to permit conclusive decision as to what is educationally best. Unfortunately these matters have usually been decided on the basis of personal conven-

ience or of immediate financial economy rather than of ultimate educational good.

17. What is the optimum number of subjects to be carried simultaneously by a pupil? — Again practice varies. The problem is closely connected, of course, with time allotments, both to the school day and to each subject; but it has a peculiar phase of its own. Do pupils learn more easily, cover more ground, and retain for a longer time when concentrating on, say, three major subjects or when distributing their attention over four, five, or six? What practice results in more assimilation, with consequent modification of attitudes and actions? In this matter opinion based on observation is of some value, but experiment under carefully controlled conditions followed by immediate and subsequent measurement of results is badly needed.

18. Which units of instruction should be required and which elective? — In some schools we find subjects prescribed that are in others elective or not offered at all. This may be, and probably in many cases is, quite proper. But certainly the decision as to requirements should be based on the soundest composite judgment of what are the common necessities in education. This involves not only an agreement on necessary units of education, but also on the extent to which they must be pursued. For example, is "the ability to read," either English or a foreign

language, an essential in the education of youth? If so, reading at what level of difficulty? With what degree of comprehension? At what rate? As with most of the problems in curriculum making, this one is so interwoven with others and it demands such a comprehension of the whole that there should be little surprise at the arbitrariness with which it is usually settled.

Elective offerings should not be determined wholly by compromise with unreasoned traditional demands of pupils or outside agencies, nor by the convenience or interests of the teaching corps. They are what curriculum makers consider further requirements for pupils with certain characteristics. Lacking omniscience and also preliminary "try-out" or sorting courses, authorities shift the responsibility of election to pupils of immature judgment and to parents often with far less information than professional schoolmen have.

This problem would be better stated in the questions: What are the bases of deciding which units of instruction should be required and which elective, and who shall be permitted to elect any given course? On the answers to these questions, working decisions can be made.

19. What lesson preparation at home can be secured from pupils? — When pupils come from homes in which they have separate study rooms, well lighted

and heated, homes in which there is an adequate library; when the regular use of this physical equipment is enforced by interested and eager parents competent to give encouragement, stimulus, and help, the curriculum problem is one thing. It is quite another when pupils as a rule must snatch opportunities for study in a room shared in common with the rest of the family, when parents are neither sympathetic nor able to help, and when outside tasks or interests consume much time and strength. Both these extremes exist, with every intermediate stage, both for individual pupils and for communal groups.

It is unreasonable to expect all schools, then, to demand or to accomplish identical results in the same amount of time. Curriculum makers must know the conditions for home study and must take them into account when laying out a program with expectancy of satisfactory accomplishment.

20. What degree of mastery is demanded? — There is general agreement that it is not sufficient for pupils merely to "get over" material, but the extent to which superficial learning is accepted is seldom realized. There is abundant evidence, however, both in scientific studies and in common observation, that half learning or less, with little retention of the learned fraction, is the result of most of our school work. This is nothing short of a scandal. One truly concerned with the future of education and

cognizant of the facts, which are clearly presented in numerous technical articles and survey reports, must live in constant apprehension of what the public would do if given a realization of the facts or if stirred and led by well-informed agitators who for one reason or another were hostile to the schools. It is necessary, therefore, for educators to decide what degree of mastery is considered satisfactory and then to measure success not merely by immediate but also by permanent possession and power.

Such an agreement would have a marked influence on curriculum making. It might result in a reduction in the number of detailed objectives sought and of the amount of material presented. It would surely provide for systematic reviews, especially in the application of facts and principles, until the subject matter, the skills, the attitudes, the habits desired were stamped in sufficiently to be used at need. The chief reason why we have been so little concerned with this matter is a lack of conviction regarding the necessity for an effective life of many of the facts taught. Whatever answer is made to the question, a careful consideration of it by revealing conditions as they exist cannot fail to lead to an improvement of the curriculum.

21. What are the possibilities of curriculum advance in the school community? — However strong tradition is among school people, it is even stronger

among laymen. Those who have been taught to reverence "education," whatever its characteristics, are prone to give inordinate respect to what they themselves have accomplished, regardless of present retainments, and, strange as it may seem, even more to the subjects which have proved difficult or which they have never had opportunity to attempt. There is much evidence, however, that intelligent and interested citizens are now increasingly receptive of new content for education when it can be justified to them in untechnical, common-sense terms. It is probable that this attitude will be even more common in the next generation, which will have had far more educational experience than this. It is an obligation on schoolmen, of course, to inform the public of any proposed important change in school practice and to convince them of its soundness and wisdom; but it is also a responsibility to know and defer to their demands, even though merely traditional and not wholly justifiable, until they can be modified. Support of the schools, continuous and sincere, is necessary for the sound success of any program.

22. What are the possibilities of curriculum advance with the teachers of the school? — It is reasonable to assume that the authorities in charge of curriculum reorganization — superintendent, principal, and supervisors — are in advance of the teachers whom they lead and direct. But it is obvious that

no sound progress is possible unless the teachers are convinced of the wisdom and validity of the new program and unless they are able to put it into successful practice. The time when the leader made a curriculum or course of study and handed it over to teachers with orders to follow it is happily past — in theory, at least, and often in practice. To-day there are many conspicuous instances of representative committees of teachers, stimulated and led by their administrative officers, working coöperatively to construct new curricula and courses of study. They will thus understand the new proposed details, as well as the general plan, and believe in them. But those actively participating too will need to keep in mind the limitations of the less able teachers, those inexperienced and limited in wisdom, and those whom much experience has made deaf to anything that materially differs from that to which they are accustomed. There is reason to believe that teachers are much more willing and capable than some administrators have thought to apply their skill to presenting new material, if it is proved to them to be of sound validity. At least assumed unwillingness or inability should not be offered as an excuse until progress is attempted with a fair effort at leadership.

23. What are the possibilities of curriculum advance with existing buildings and equipment? — Every subject requires room and its own peculiar equipment.

Sometimes it is necessary to limit the offerings in a certain subject or to omit it altogether because there is no physical room for it or because adequate equipment is lacking. But at other times school administrators have planned a building or purchased equipment without previously determining exactly what the educational needs were. They have thus allowed the physical wholly to determine the intellectual and the spiritual.

The ideal educational program should first be prepared. Only then is it time to consider what compromises the physical plant demands. If the proposed program has sufficiently obvious validity, it is not hopeless to look forward to a provision by a convinced public for what is needed to present it successfully. Pending that, teachers have shown astounding ingenuity in finding or devising temporary equipment or in adapting what they possess, provided they have real understanding and enthusiastic belief in the new program, both as a whole and in its details.

24. What are the possibilities with available textbooks? — Although it is frequently stated as an ideal that textbooks should be used only to supplement the plan of a teacher, the fact remains that they are frequently followed with implicit confidence in detail. More than anything else they are the courses of study for the vast majority of teachers. This fact should not justify a wholesale condemnation. A part of the

criticism, at least, should be reserved for those who have not led the teachers to develop better courses of their own or to use textbooks more wisely. Another part must go to the public who fail to provide funds adequate to secure teachers who can do so, or who demand of those employed such full days and nights that they do not have the time and the strength to prepare such independent programs as they may be capable of doing.

Despite the dominance of textbooks, no adequate standards for their evaluation and selection have been prepared, and such provisional standards as have been proposed are seldom applied. Every one familiar with the ways in which textbooks are selected must be convinced of the crying need for ideals and standards. The reason they have not been prepared and accepted in practice is the same as that for slow progress in curriculum revision: they must be underlain by an entire and consistent philosophy of education. And that is still in the making. This is no adequate excuse, however, for our not making and applying such provisional standards as we assuredly are ready to formulate.

Under existing limitations in teachers and restrictions due to full programs of work, the dominating influence of the textbook will be long continued. It is incumbent, then, upon educational authorities to consider the possibilities with the best texts available

and, when it is not possible to secure an ideal book or immediately to develop adequate supplementary material, frankly to recognize the necessity of compromise. If this compromise is thoroughly understood, supervision and continuous effort will in time materially reduce its extent, and there is always the possibility of the appearance of a text better for the particular situation.

Other possibilities of advance lie in the purchase not of sets of a single text, one for each pupil, but of the same number by several different authors with varying plans, and in a wider use of the materials, books and magazines, in the school or public library. Both plans require teachers of unusual intelligence and industry, and both demand not only constant aid and encouragement from supervisors but also a clearly formulated course of study for the subject in hand. The "lack of suitable textbooks" is a handicap, it is true, but as often as not it is an excuse rather than a reason for lack of progress in curriculum revision.

25. What are the limitations imposed by administrative procedure? — After an ideal program of curricula and courses of study is prepared, complete adoption will be found impossible or impracticable because of administrative matters not previously mentioned. For example, though rooms and equipment may exist, they may be demanded at the same

time by two or more classes. Furthermore, the program may call for less of the work of a specialist than will give him a full program, and he may be incompetent to teach other subjects, or it may leave a shop or expensive laboratory unoccupied for many periods of the week. When these obstacles are recognized, the cost of accepting them must be contrasted directly with the values likely to result from an adoption of the ideal. Economies are an obligation, but they must be real economies, educational and permanent. When all these matters are considered, a compromise is justified, of course; but not before. Again, if the extent of the compromise is recognized, it may in time be materially reduced. Otherwise it is not likely to be.

26. What are the characteristics of the pupils? — Uniform curricula and courses of study are an anomaly. Investigations have shown in pupils a range of background, of previous attainments, of capacities, of aptitudes, of interests, and of needs that astound even the most careful observers. These differences exist not only in individuals but also in communal groups. Whatever they are and to whatever extent they exist, every modern philosophy of education recognizes that they must be provided for in the curriculum.

It is incumbent, therefore, on curriculum makers first of all to know what these backgrounds — previous attainments, capacities, aptitudes, interests, and immediate needs — are, and secondly to decide what

provision should be made for each. (In the last simple phrase is implied the necessity of a wisdom at present transcending that of man!) There is some possibility of making curricula and courses so elastic and adaptable, especially in large schools, that each individual may be appropriately educated. But for the most part economy will necessitate provision for modal groups, in contradistinction to a conventional offering, which may be suited to only a gifted few or to none. Even this would be a significant and material advance over the present prevailing practice, especially in small schools.

27. What are the most probable future needs of pupils? — However impossible accurate prophecy may be, prophecy of some sort is demanded of every curriculum maker. For not only must education satisfy immediate wants, it must also prepare for the satisfaction of the important ones most likely to occur later. Secondary education has in the past, indeed, laid its emphasis largely on future contingent needs — the possible rather than the probable. As all possible needs cannot be prepared for and as it has been shown that much preparation never finds a need or use, the tendency is now to ask first what needs are likely to arise and then from them to select the ones of most relative worth, for which the school assumes the responsibility.

If it be assumed that the pupils now in school will

when grown act for the most part like their parents and brothers and sisters, an inventory of the actions of these adults may form the basis for a curriculum — additions or subtractions being made as judgment dictates. If another assumption seems superior, it should be used. But the fact that one realizes his fallibility as a prophet is no excuse for his not using his abilities, his knowledge, and the best methods at his disposal to anticipate with the curriculum future needs of the pupils.

Prophecy is involved, too, in a special application of a phase of this question: For which pupils may certain training be safely deferred with assurance that they will receive it later on a higher level of instruction? If the odds are that one group of pupils will leave school for work at the end of the compulsory-education period, elements of economics, for example, may seem for them imperative in the seventh grade; whereas the same elements may safely be deferred for other pupils until maturity makes a better comprehension possible, provided that there is a strong probability of these pupils continuing their education sufficiently long. Decision in the matter of deferred values is also partly dependent on a prophecy of the persistence of pupils.

This list of questions, which undoubtedly is not exhaustive, contains some of fundamental importance

and others of less. But the necessity of answering in some way each and every one before curricula and courses of study are soundly made cannot but be recognized and admitted. The difficulties involved are obvious, largely explaining why tradition is so easily perpetuated and why progress, substantial as some of it is, is relatively small. It is only natural that administrators confine their efforts largely to more easily accomplished duties with results more definitely obvious. A building may be seen and admired; an age-grade table may be read and checked; a report on reduced percentages of tardiness and absence may be understood and applauded by almost any citizen. By such things they largely judge of the success of an administrator. Curriculum reconstruction or modification, on the other hand, cannot be appreciated by either laymen or the majority of teachers. But is there any question of the superior importance of content to that of the physical plant, of the organization and administration of schools, of the discipline, and of the methods of instruction? Is it not obvious that the curriculum should be a cause of all these matters rather than largely a result of them? The paramount importance of the curriculum being admitted, it follows as a matter of course that the State should make far more provision for its improvement than it has done in the past.

To whom and to what methods, then, shall we look

for most aid? The list of questions reveals many that can be answered with a fair degree of satisfaction by only the ablest of professional men and women, many the answers to which are of an importance and value common to all schools. The universities and colleges, which might contribute much of determining theory, have accepted as their primary responsibility the training of men and women in those duties which they will be required by the public to perform. They have contributed much of theory, and it is unreasonable to expect them, inadequately endowed as they are, to do much more without materially increased support for this specific purpose. Committees and commissions have made important contributions; but almost without exception because of inadequate support they have been forced to work hurriedly and at the expense of the individual members. Every one who has served on committees of this nature knows how unrepresentative and unsatisfactory the reports are because the members, however competent, have been forced by their other obligations to hasty and incomplete work.

As the making of the curriculum is a responsibility of the State quite as much as the erection of buildings and the employment of teachers; as there are many important unsolved curriculum problems common to all schools; and as the work demands long-continued coöperative labor by the wisest and best informed of

men, it seems reasonable to propose a contribution by a considerable number of school districts to finance commissions for the study and determination of as many fundamental problems as may be of common concern. The traditional feeling of the independence of the school district as well as the apparent intangibility of the task would make this, in all probability, difficult; but it should not be impossible. Legislatures may be led to make appropriations for such work in the several states — the more, the better, as a comparison of results separately arrived at would be of mutual advantage. And there is the possibility of endowment by individual philanthropists or by foundations.

But whatever the source of support, some procedure is demanded to insure substantial progress in this most important and strangely neglected field. Let there be no mistaken notion of the difficulty, the extent, and the tediousness of the task. And even when such commissions have reported, there will remain abundant work to be done by the teachers of schools and by school systems. Pending such reports the efforts of individuals and of small groups to ameliorate curricula should not, of course, be intermitted. The task of curriculum improvement is as unending as are the changes in society and in the pupil population.

CHAPTER II

EMOTIONALIZED ATTITUDES

It has already been postulated that any adequate consideration of the curriculum must concern itself with the whole of life. Hitherto the formal curriculum has been wholly, or almost wholly, composed of intellectual elements; but life is wholly, or almost wholly, colored by the emotions. The psychologists maintain that there is an affective concomitant with the most severely intellectual facts, such as the parity of two angles; ranging from this extreme we find situations that produce reactions so emotional that it is difficult to discover in them any intellectual element, immediate or remote. It is with the emotional attitudes that dominate or strongly influence not only actions but also intellectualization that this discussion will be concerned.

The affective causes of action and thought. — "I believe," writes a student of school curricula, "that all human actions should be inspired by intellect." Maybe so; but the fact is that very few actions have immediate intellectual causes unaffected by feelings. Moreover, with surprisingly slight exaggeration it may be said that we really think only to rationalize a

position impulsively taken or an action inspired by an emotional attitude. (Possibly the attitude taken toward the statement just made by the "thoughtful" reader may illustrate the point.) It once was rather generally held by students that the ideal was to think after the pattern of a geometrical proof, although a moment's introspection would have shown that this pattern is used only for the organization of proof after conclusions have been reached. Dewey replaced and improved this ideal in his *How We Think*, which might better be entitled *How a Gifted Man Thinks We Ought to Think*. Nearly all thinking, certainly that of the majority of men, is far different. It begins in feeling, is continuously colored by emotionalized attitudes, and often ends in a rationalization, itself tintured or glowing with emotions, of the position taken. The very use of Dewey's pattern to improve thinking itself begins in complexity and is attended by a glow of feeling, a concomitant of consciousness of intellectual superiority.

We feel more than we think. — "Our intellect," wrote an unknown psychologist, "is a mere speck afloat on a sea of feeling." This speck is of tremendous importance, to be appreciated, respected, and increased however possible. The curriculum has been devoted to it. There is no depreciation of it, not the slightest, in a recognition of the incontrovertible fact that along with the speck of intellect, often

dissolving or profoundly modifying it, is an ocean of feeling. This must be a concern too of any comprehensive curriculum. We feel more, both quantitatively and qualitatively, than we think. "One emotion will cover a multitude of ideas."

Exact definition of terms not attempted. — At this point logically there should be given a definition of the terms *feeling*, *emotions*, and *emotionalized*. To do so satisfactorily is for two reasons impossible: first, though everyone "feels" and from time to time is conscious of emotions of love, fear, hate, anger, and grief, few men other than specialists in psychology consider them verbally in such way as to be helped rather than hindered in their understanding by definition; second, the psychologists, who to a limited extent have discussed them, so fail to agree that an attempt at exact definition would doubtless confuse the issue. "As far as 'scientific psychology' of the emotions goes," wrote William James, "I may have been surfeited by too much reading of classic works on the subject, but I should as lief read verbal descriptions of the shapes of the rocks on a New Hampshire farm as toil through them again. They give one nowhere a central point of view, or a deductive or generative principle." Whether the feelings and emotions are the result of vaso-motor and other bodily changes, the sum of complex organic sensations,¹

¹ James Mosso *et al.*

or are possible along with complete visceral anesthesia¹ is for our purpose immaterial. Layman and scientist alike are familiar with the psychosis of joy, grief, awe, and so on, each having a tendency toward a characteristic reactive display — for anger “frowns, compressed lips, erect head, clenched fists,” for joy “dancing, clapping the hands, and meaningless laughter.” If not inhibited or restrained, these responses tend to increase the feeling. Emotion gives the feeling tone to other forms of consciousness. With our senses we ordinarily perceive an object with no conscious feeling; if we perceive it as something that does or is likely to contribute more or less immediately to our happiness or discomfort, there is a concomitancy of feeling. Indeed, if the object perceived has recently contributed materially in such manner, it is likely to arouse in us feeling.

Generalized attitudes as determinants of responses. — But reaction, intellectual or physical, is seldom determined directly by thinking or by action that is original. As a result of inheritance and experience, sometimes single but usually multiple, every one develops a large number of more or less generalized attitudes, which condition and to a large extent determine all future responses. By nature one is in general conservative or radical, restrained or impulsive, temperate or extreme. Having been made ill

¹ Sherrington, *Proceedings Royal Society* (1900), XVI, pp. 390 ff.

by oysters, comfortable by a Scotch Highland family, or confused by a puzzle of steel links, one tends to acquire toward oysters, Scotch Highlanders, or steel link puzzles attitudes that will persist until modified by rationalization or, what is more likely, by another actual experience with different results. Such attitudes or "sets" are commonly observed toward certain foreign peoples, a section of the country, a political party, labor unions, or business corporations. We see them firmly established, potent and constantly functioning, in adults; in children and in youth we observe them forming, less obdurate and less consistently determining responses. These are stereotypes, economies that short-circuit the processes of response. There could be small accomplishment if every situation had to be considered anew in all its elements. Attitudes are true economies, however, only if they are the proper results of correctly interpreted experience, only if along with them is developed a willingness, an alertness, to reconsider and modify them in the light of changed conditions. As we may say that one is to a large extent the sum of all of his attitudes, education is interested in which ones are developed and in which ones become indurated against modification.

Some attitudes are emotionalized. — These more or less fixed attitudes become of the greatest importance when they are charged with emotions, as

they always are in greater or in less degree. Some attitudes are so strongly emotionalized that they either materially modify any application of intellectual processes to a situation or may even effectually prevent it. These emotionalized attitudes we propose now to consider at some length in their bearing on curriculum reconstruction.

For the present we simply recognize that emotionalized attitudes are a fact. One person may have an attitude of neatness that results in a habit of clearing up his desk — regularly, systematically, and unfeelingly; another may have the attitude that leads to the same habit with this difference: the result is accompanied by a rich glow of satisfaction, a violation, by himself or by others, by keen discomfort and irritating annoyance. The same person may have strong feeling about the neatness of his desk and little or apparently none of it about the neatness of his top chiffonier drawer. He may have an attitude highly emotionalized toward doffing his hat in an elevator in which ladies are riding, a chivalrous custom with slight logical justification, and a habit with little or no feeling about giving up his seat to a lady standing in the subway, which certainly has more reason that the intellect can approve. A person may equally approve with his intellect the reasonableness of beginning and of ending meetings promptly, and yet he may feel so strongly regarding promptness of begin-

nings as to be almost a fanatic on the matter while consistently and undisturbedly running over at the other end.

On every hand we observe in our acquaintances and even in ourselves habits and attitudes, such as of neatness or cleanliness, that are similarly approved by the intellect, whereas one has a powerful emotional concomitant and the other apparently none at all. This variation may also be seen in two or more phases of similarly named attitudes, such as honesty or tolerance: one may be honest with his intellect regarding the borrowing of books and honest with his intellect *and* his feelings regarding the borrowing of money. The resulting amounts of satisfaction are not an obvious explanation.

Education concerned with the degree of emotionalization. — There seem to be other factors, subtle and as yet not discovered, that determine the amount of feeling that accompanies one's attitudes. Other things being at all equal, attitudes that are emotionalized are most likely to lead to action. Consequently education is concerned not merely with what attitudes are established, but also to what degree each one is emotionalized. Moreover, as Ben D. Wood suggests, it is possible that we can build up a habit of "reserved feeling" just as we sometimes do of "reserved judgment." This would involve specific training in recognizing emotions in their incipency

or even in foreseeing and avoiding situations, expressions, and attitudes that are most potent in provoking emotional storms.

Why one attitude becomes emotionalized while another of apparently equal or greater soundness and importance does not, we know with little certainty. For the present we simply recognize that this is a fact. Furthermore as we observe and reflect we recognize the importance of emotionalized attitudes. An adult confronted by a recurrent situation is usually at once ready with an attitude, often highly emotionalized, toward it. The champion of fundamentalism is an ignorant bigot or a sainted leader; the kaiser is a fallen hero to be pitied or an overthrown despot to be despised; a Jew is "greedy and selfish" or "a patient sufferer of unreasoning racial enmity" — emotional words these — even before we consider what he says or does. The Democrat or Baptist is received with an "instinctive" predilection or the reverse, however faint it may be, that colors all facts observed or otherwise learned about him.

The onset of the emotionalization of attitudes. — On this matter a distinguished psychologist,¹ with an attitude of original thinking, writes:

"In studying the life history of any person we can see how they (attitudes) have oftentimes furthered or

¹ Watson, *Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist*, pp. 239-240.

hindered his life work and disturbed his personal balance. Shyness and the inferiority attitude may keep a man tied all his life to an accustomed but unremunerative job. They have oftentimes prevented his marriage or brought about a poorly adjusted marriage or kept him out of a wider social circle. On the other hand, in other cases too much aggressiveness has just as often made impossible a man's chances of making good business and social connections."

In young children emotionalized attitudes seem to be very evanescent, if they can be said to exist at all; in adults, they are to a great extent fixed and permanent. When do attitudes become emotionalized so that they tend to persist? Observation and preliminary studies suggest that somewhere in the period of adolescence feeling, from unknown causes, adheres to or interfuses certain attitudes, and from that time on are such essential determinants of responses as to be an important, perhaps the most important, part of character.

Stimulants to action. — What are the effects of these emotionalized attitudes? In the first place they stimulate to action. An idea, a completed syllogism, a problem solved, an intellectualized attitude may be satisfying, each in itself; they may condition action when it comes. Whereas the emotionalized attitude suggests or shouts, according to the amount

of feeling involved, "Let us do something."¹ And it is just as likely as its calmer, uninspired brethren to have its plan of action. Lacking this, it is receptive of another's. But quiescent it cannot be. "It may be contended with plausibility that the fugitive slave riots and the John Brown raid had more to do with influencing the final course of events than the speeches of Lincoln in his campaign against Douglas."

That the action is similar to the one which met the same situation previously is most likely. New factors when recognized merely modify the response; they seldom restrain or inhibit it. Even an original situation is likely to be met with emotionalized attitudes, for they are transferred with ease, impulsively and immediately, from former experiences that have important factors in common with the new. This

¹ " . . . The broad generalization may hold that receptive states lead through feeling to active states, and that presentations that give neither pleasure nor pain meet with no responsive action. But first the objection must be met that presentations that are in themselves purely indifferent lead continually to very energetic action, often the promptest and most definite action. To this there are two answers. First, on the higher levels of psychical life presentations in themselves indifferent are often indirectly interesting as signs of, or as means to, other presentations that are more directly interesting. . . . Secondly, a large class of movements . . . tend at length . . . to become 'secondarily automatic.' . . . Here, again, . . . there is a fair presumption in favor of supposing all such movements to have been originally initiated by feeling, as certainly very many of them were." James Ward, "Psychology," in *Encyclopædia Britannica*, XXII, p. 581.

explains why so frequently one immediately responds to a new acquaintance, symphony, landscape, or political problem with such a suffusion of feeling. When the emotion attaches itself to a sound intellectual conclusion, the partnership is ideal. But untrained, a neglected part of our curriculum, it is not always fastidious of its company.

Attitudes persist after causes are forgotten. — Often it is easy — indeed it is a habit of the superior, reflective mind when challenged — to trace an emotionalized attitude back to a justifying intellectual cause. What is usually overlooked is that the attitude may strongly persist long after the original cause has been modified or intellectually denied, and also that the emotion may be stronger than the intelligent cause may warrant. As an illustration of the former: one brought up with a strong feeling of repugnance for the Republican party later, after recognizing that there is about the same proportion of good and bad men in one party as in another, may still retain an emotional disposition to distrust any person or any issue identified with the Republicans. Of course this is overcome many times, partly by cold intelligence, partly — and often — by a stronger opposing emotional attitude.

As an illustration of an emotional response being associated with an unimportant and non-causative part of a stimulus we may cite the experience of a

university professor. Walking down the corridor one day he felt annoyed by the unidentified voice of a colleague lecturing in a near-by hall. Pausing in his growing irritation, he finally associated the voice, which was in itself not unpleasant, with a colleague for most of whose abilities he had great respect but with the others a feeling of sharp disagreement. Careful introspection by any observant person will probably adduce other similar experiences. Emotionalized attitudes persisting after their causes have been removed or such attitudes illogically associated with insignificant parts of a whole situation are dangerous. Somewhere in one's education it seems that means of preventing such mischievous results should be attempted.

Influences of intellectual receptivity. — Another effect, and a potent one, of emotionalized attitudes, toward ideas and especially toward persons, is frequently recognized (especially in others) as influencing or determining intellectual receptivity. We say that we must "catch him in the mood to understand" such and such a proposal, or that "he will listen to so and so." What does this mean other than that the emotional attitude of a person colors even plain facts and syllogisms? The "mood to understand" may be inhibited by other and temporarily stronger interests or attitudes, and of course may be greatly modified by the exercise of will. But receptivity, intelligent fair-

mindedness, is likely only if there has been developed an ideal, which is emotional, in its favor, an ideal strong enough to break down less important feelings. Surely even a consciousness of this should facilitate the development of the attitude that education has long and variously sought.

"Sympathetic,"¹ as well as "hostile" listening or

¹*Sympathetic* is here used in a sense far different from that implied by Miss Follett in the following passage in *The New State*: "Suppose a friend says something with which I do not agree. It may be that instantly I feel antagonistic, feel as if we were on opposite sides, and my emotions are at once tinged with some of the enmity which being on opposite sides usually brings. Our relations become slightly strained, we change the subject as soon as possible, etc. But suppose we were really civilized beings, then we should think: 'How interesting this is, this idea has evidently a larger content than I realized; if my friend and I can unify this material, we shall separate with a larger idea than either of us had before.' If my friend and I are always trying to find the things upon which we agree, what is the use of our meeting? Because the consciousness of agreement makes us happy? It is a shallow happiness, only felt by people too superficial or too shut-up or too vain to feel that richer joy which comes from having taken part in an act of creation — created a new thought by the uniting of differences. A friendship based on likenesses and agreements alone is a superficial matter enough. The deep and lasting friendship is one capable of recognizing and dealing with all the fundamental differences that must exist between any two individuals, one capable therefore of such an enrichment of our personalities that together we shall mount to new heights of understanding and endeavor. Some one ought to write an essay on the dangers to the soul of congeniality. Pleasant little glows of feeling can never be fanned into the fire which becomes the driving force of progress."

reading is always prejudicial to sound intellectual conclusions. No reflective person can have failed to observe illustrations from his own experience. One instance may be quoted from that careful scientist, Charles Darwin.¹ "The exhibition was of use to me in another way, by convincing me how easily we may be misguided by our imagination; for when I first looked through Dr. Duchenne's photographs, reading at the same time the text, and thus learning what was intended, I was struck with admiration at the truthfulness of it all, with only a few exceptions. Nevertheless, if I had examined them without any explanation, no doubt I should have been as much perplexed, in some cases, as other persons have been."

The emotionalized attitude toward persons which influences or determines intellectual receptivity is doubtless more difficult to control, for as a rule it is more deeply seated and is based on previous experiences that have intelligent justification along with varying concomitances of feeling. Concretely, one has learned from several contacts that a politician is shallow, short-sighted, and selfish; this gradually developed conclusion is attended by a feeling of distrust and of personal dislike. When, therefore, the politician proposes new legislation there is a natural inclination to discredit and oppose it without fair consideration. This is perhaps a protective device of

¹ *Expressions of the Emotions in Man and Animals*, p. 14.

economy; but it easily develops to such an unreasonable extreme that a sound proposal may go unexamined. Education should develop a strongly emotionalized attitude in favor of acting in accord with the anonymous "not who is right, but what is true" and wise and feasible.

Influences of interpretation. — A closely allied effect of emotionalized attitudes is on the interpretation of facts. This is the commonest of intellectual phenomena. The same fact is interpreted by each of two opponents as supporting his contention. Further than this, a fact considered in one emotionalized attitude leads to one intellectual conclusion; received with another it may lead to quite a contradictory one. There is relatively little disagreement about the original facts involved in many disputed issues; but because of different emotionalized attitudes they are interpreted so variously as to produce other secondary facts and opposing conclusions. We believe what is told us by our beloved allopathic physician, especially if it can be interpreted as contributing to our desires; we discredit the opinion or the facts, especially those hostile, of the homeopathist. And there are physicians for all our ills — political, social, economic, as well as physical. In this day of specialists the educated man should have been trained to recognize that his emotionalized attitudes do influence his interpretation of facts and his judgments so that he may

consider this factor and discount it when seeking sound conclusions; and, moreover, he should have been trained how to find the specialist toward whom he may for the sake of safety, comfort, economy, and consequent effective action develop a favorable emotionalized attitude. It involves, as James Ward states, "the recognition of the subject's attitude as essential to the reaction, and of this as determined by pleasure, pain, or some 'interest' resting ultimately on these." This does not debar him from at the same time preserving toward the advice of the specialist a soundly critical attitude, for which ideal some have developed also a feeling attitude.

A means of integration. — A final effect to be mentioned of emotionalized attitudes concerns one of the important ends of education, integration. This has been proposed in educational literature and, its importance being immediately and generally recognized, it is more or less tacitly accepted; but one searches in vain for any list of matters concerning which it is desirable for citizens to be unified. Men may be integrated by what they know and by what they feel. Other factors being neglected, I am drawn to a man who knows, as I do, some detail or group of details; he becomes my bosom friend or my arch enemy according as we feel. "Genuine integration," as Miss Follett says, "occurs in the sphere of activities, and not of ideas or wills," and with activities is an affective

element. Whenever there is desire for concerted action the importance of integrating the citizenry is recognized. During the World War, as every one will recall, we achieved some degree of unity of action through the dissemination of information, but how much more through appeals to the emotions! Some of the "facts" used to unify our people have since been proved false; but action was achieved and some measure of common feeling still remains. Although being gradually modified by other factors, it still causes a "disposition to act," which is not neglected by either statesman or demagogue. Is integration, either intelligent or emotional, less truly important in times of peace — in politics, in religion, in social intercourse? Can a state afford to neglect for its promotion what it so successfully uses for its preservation? — Another reason for curriculum concern with emotional attitudes.

A concern of the curriculum. — So far the importance of emotionalized attitudes has been stressed. An attempt has been made to show that in providing curricula consideration must be given to the whole life, in which the feelings, especially those that tend to persist, play a no unimportant part. They move to action, directly and indirectly, they condition the reception and the interpretation of facts, and they are most influential in integrating the members of a group. On them are largely dependent our friend-

ships and our enmities, our social happiness, and indirectly our success and failure in life. Consideration must therefore be given to the relation of the emotionalized attitudes to intelligence and to questions of their source and of means of their modification and use.

A reader of the preceding pages may very easily be misled — perhaps by his own existing and deep-seated feelings — into conceiving that the discussion of emotionalized attitudes disparages the importance of the intellect in education. Quite the contrary. Its importance is not only admitted, it is even strongly urged as the most distinguishing element between man and lower animals and between different levels of mankind, and as a basis for the phase of feeling. It cannot be too consistently or too skilfully influenced for greater effectiveness. The emphasis has merely been on another element of man, his emotionalized attitudes. However originated, they are a potent and a constant cause of conduct. As such they must be recognized in any comprehensive program of curriculum reform.

Common and potent as emotionalized attitudes are in influencing action directly or through the coloring of intellectual processes, they are seldom brought into the focus of intelligence and, as our particular concern here, they have not been an important concern of curriculum makers. Appreciation of their existence

and potency should do much not merely to put an individual on his guard lest they lead him to consequences intellectually and socially disastrous but also to awaken in him concern as to what emotionalized attitudes are developed in his children. Except for the unguided, fortuitous efforts of individual teachers the school has done little or nothing directly. General statements of aims, even if they recognize in phrases of character-building the factor of emotionalized attitudes, are seldom if ever translated into details of courses of study. The home and the church have recognized the matter but dimly, and their achievements have been far less due to formal conscious than to incidental unconscious effort. Perhaps this is wise; but without the most serious consideration we are not in a position to know.

Maxims and slogans. — One means that the home and the church have used to develop emotionalized attitudes is maxims and slogans. But these bits of folk or popular wisdom are usually accepted and quoted with little intellectual consideration. For this is substituted approval by the feelings, which are influenced by terseness, alliteration, or rhyme. In consequence, as man “thinks” with one emotion at a time, this total influence through maxims is contradictory. “Haste makes waste,” “slow but sure,” and “the tortoise and the hare” are quoted glibly — and feelingly — by the same person who hurries to get his

tasks efficiently done and who accepts intellectually the teaching of psychology that "correlation rather than compensation" is the rule. At one moment he shouts, "My country, may she always be right; but right or wrong — my country!" and at the next he sets off with enthusiasm for a convention to promote "international mindedness" and equal rights for all people. He fights with the Bible in his pocket. He ridicules the "stolid Englishman" and chuckles with the Sidney Smiths. Even "logical thinking," "the cultural effects of the classics," and "a scientific attitude of mind" he has quoted to throw an intellectual cloak over an ardent and contradicting mind-set. One may call this "illogical"; but it is also correct to call it the temporary victory of the emotions over the intellect. All agree that the frequency and the extent of such victories should be reduced. When the feelings are dominant, should they not be the right feelings rightly directed?

When emotionalized attitudes and the intellect conflict. — What happens when an emotionalized attitude and an intellectual fact or syllogism conflict? The best answer may be found in personal experience and in observation. Do *we* always subordinate our "preference" to cold, hard reason, whereas *other people* rationalize the intellectual so that it supports the emotional? It is unnecessary to be quantitative here, where feeling attitudes so warp our

judgment; it is quite sufficient for us to recognize the fact that when emotionalized attitude and intelligence conflict, the latter frequently becomes ancillary to the former, and that, in the best of us, a new emotionalized attitude, rationalized and more intellectually based, results, ready for another conflict, in which the new attitude, suffused with feeling, may be potent regardless of new and different conditions. On the lower levels of intelligence emotionalized attitudes tend to be accepted as finalities, seldom reconsidered by the intelligence in the light of new conditions. Our ideal is an emotionalized attitude founded on soundly functioning intellect, subject to critical review and modification when new factors appear, and leading inevitably and economically to beneficent action. There is very little unhabituated action that is not stimulated by feeling.

Uses of emotionalized attitudes by leaders. — The amount, the constancy, and probably the quality of emotions obviously differ in individuals. Modern scientists, in abandoning the old classification of men as phlegmatic, sanguine, choleric, and melancholic, have possibly lost a lead that would be valuable if it proves wise for education seriously to concern itself with the development or modification of emotionalized attitudes. How these differences are correlated with intelligence and desirable leadership psychology as yet does not tell us. Observation seems to show that,

although there may be original thinkers who in their conception or presentation of new ideas or plans involve or betray scarcely any emotion, effective leadership on even slightly lower levels is suffused by it. In this connection may be noted Papini's account of the tragic weakening, misinterpretation, and prostitution of a master's ideas by his disciples, men who are effective practical leaders of others even when they fail intellectually to comprehend basic meaning. Certainly these secondary leaders, known to-day in every field of activity, philosophical as truly as religious, are not only themselves activated by strong emotional attitudes, but they use an evangelical rather than an intellectual method that proves highly effective with those whom they influence.

Descending to lower strata of intelligence, which include the vast majority of mankind, we find leaders appealing to emotionalized attitudes far more than to intelligence — sometimes, indeed, it would seem almost to the exclusion of mental processes. Orators who sway six-tenths (or is it nine-tenths?) of mankind appeal to prejudices, dispositions, attitudes — all highly emotionalized, with remote and often unrecognized bases of intelligence varying in unrespectability — appeal to them, inflame them, and direct them to desired actions. A recent debate between a governor and a former governor, heard by thousands over the radio, concerned a question of state policy.

Although the argument was logical, supported by bristling arrays of facts, and sometimes brilliant, one was impressed, both from the reactions of the crowd in the hall and from editorial comment in the press, by the effectiveness of those appeals which were directed to emotionalized attitudes of the audience. The preserved speeches of Isocrates and Cicero show that this is no new phenomenon. Human nature is disconcertingly constant despite centuries of intellectual evolution directed by education. All this emphasizes the question of whether or not the new curriculum shall concern itself with emotionalized attitudes which not only persist but are constantly and generally potent in determining and directing action, especially of those who are not exceptionally intellectual. Even our secondary schools are to-day concerned with a third or more of the entire adolescent population.

Importance increased by an extending world. — Conduct, whether according to Matthew Arnold four-fifths of life or less, is still overwhelmingly the end of education. Browning's Grammarian with his incomplete philosophy is a sorry citizen. And conduct is based on knowledge, on belief, or on faith. Knowledge may be almost wholly intellectual, as faith may be almost wholly emotional. When one's world was local and simple, knowledge, as cold as it ever becomes, could be (but doubtless seldom was) the basis

of nearly all conduct. To-day every one's world is tremendously extended and complex. Facilitation of intercommunication has necessarily increased the proportion of conduct that must be based on faith, whatever its degrees of concomitant feelings — and it always must have much. The more certain the knowledge, the smaller the segment of life to which it applies. How little we retain of definite facts, even of principles! How constant the necessities of re-learning and of new learning by those who demand some degree of intellectual basis for actions! But emotionalized attitudes function constantly — for the intelligentsia in demanding and interpreting knowledge, for all the rest in varying degrees leading to immediate action. The very triumphs of scholarship, of civilization, have increased the inherent importance of modifying and directing emotionalized attitudes.

The school does teach attitudes. — “What right,” it may be interposed, “has the school to interfere with or to direct this essence of individual character?”

“ ‘It’s a dangerous thing to play with souls,
And matter enough to save one’s own.’ ”

But the school, as one of several agencies, *is* teaching attitudes whether we will or not — not only teaching attitudes but also, which may be of far more importance, suffusing them with feelings which, varying

persistent, insure definite actions. Even though the curriculum were wholly intellectual, which it is not, there are always along with the purest facts concomitant learnings that are emotionalized and often dominant over great masses of the intellectualized. For example, a pupil learns to pass his factual tests on mathematics; but at the same time he develops an attitude, which is more or less emotionalized, of enthusiasm or of hatred for the subject, of accuracy which spreads or does not spread to other fields, of conviction that secondary education should be made more widely possible or restricted, of democracy or the reverse toward his fellow students. Not only this, but teachers consciously and rather consistently do now attempt to influence the ideals of their pupils. To be especially noted, however, is that, although approval is given to success, the school takes no official cognizance of this important matter; except in general statements the curriculum makes no mention of it. Every teacher is left to follow his own inclination and his own ideal, though they may be contradictory to those of another colleague. The matter is too important to be sporadic and fortuitous.

Sensitiveness. — One explanation of the curriculum neglect seems to be, first of all, that man is more sensitive regarding his emotions than his intellect. Strangers will discuss facts; only friends exchange confidences on their feelings. One excuses an intel-

lectual error, "That was only a slip" or "My facts were wrong," often unblushingly and without apology; whereas an error of the emotions causes unconcealed or remorseful shame. Physical exposure is to many less humiliating than emotional. Recall the chagrin experienced when you laughed out of season or were moved to tears by something that excited your comrades to laughter. Our Anglo-Saxon attitude toward emotion in others no less militates against frank consideration of the matter. Though sympathetic ourselves and moved with admiration for sincere emotional expression by others, we not infrequently comment on it with scorn or ridicule. Especially is this likely to be the case when emotional expression is extreme. Hamlet's ravings at the grave of Ophelia do not always elicit the response that the dramatist intended. Even a suspicion of insincerity effectually prevents sympathy; and in so subtle a matter sincerity is difficult to convey consistently. Is there any wonder that concerning emotions and emotionalized attitudes we become reticent or conceal our own feelings under a cloak of indifference or raillery?

From this discussion four major questions arise:

1. From what sources do emotionalized attitudes come?
2. What are desirable emotionalized attitudes?
3. Which are the concern of the school?

4. How may they be created? developed? modified? and directed toward beneficent action?

The sources. — *From what sources do emotionalized attitudes come?* No chapters of psychology are less satisfying than those concerning the emotions. Science furnishes the practical curriculum maker with little information on this highly complex topic; indeed the treatments of it by psychologists often reveal the varying effects on them of such emotionalized attitudes as now concern us. Definitions like “an emotion is a conscious stirred-up state of the organism” help as little as the classifications under major rubrics of fear, rage, and love; and petulant asseverations that emotions should be subordinated to the intellect palliate a phenomenon nevertheless of major importance. The potency of emotionalized attitudes being admitted as conditioning, stimulating, and determining both thought and conduct, we need to know whence attitudes come and how they are emotionalized in order that we may learn to develop, modify, and direct them for desired ends. Having faith that nothing is uncaused, we are sure that both science and empiricism can contribute to our need when, recognizing its seriousness, they give attention to this neglected topic.

Inherited causes. — At present we are largely in the dark. But we assume that some causes of emotionalized attitudes lie in inheritance and others in

environment. Watson,¹ indeed, states that emotion is an hereditary pattern-reaction involving profound changes of the bodily mechanism as a whole, but particularly of the visceral and glandular systems. The physical basis of emotions is supported by the James-Lange theory, which may be recalled by the epigrammatic statement of James that "we feel sorry because we cry, angry because we strike, afraid because we tremble, and not that we cry or strike or tremble, because we are sorry, angry, or fearful, as the case may be," and by such studies as those by Cannon,² which show profound bodily changes accompanying emotional states.³

The close association of emotions with the physical is also shown by common observation. One is more likely to tolerate a contradictory statement than a check to bodily action. A tweak of the nose will arouse to violence the most lethargic, who may meet

¹ *Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist*, p. 215.

² *Bodily Changes in Pain, Hunger, Fear and Rage: An Account of Recent Researches into the Function of Emotional Excitement*.

³ "Il se fait une série de mouvements généraux de flexion, comme si l'animal voulait se rendre plus petit, et offrir moins de surface à la douleur. Il est intéressant de remarquer que, pour l'homme comme pour tous les animaux, on retrouve ces mêmes mouvements généraux de flexion et d'extension répondant aux sentiments différents de plaisir et de la douleur. La plaisir répond à un mouvement d'épanouissement, de dilation, d'extension. Au contraire, dans la douleur, on se repétisse, on se referme sur soi; c'est un mouvement général de flexion." C. Richet, *L'Homme d'Intelligence: La Douleur*, p. 9.

a verbal insult with complacency. Comparatively few adults will submit to the physical powerlessness resulting from a ride on a loop-the-loop or "scenic railway"; one introspection, at least, revealed a fuming rage at the indignity of being whirled helplessly through space. A story by Carl Van Doren ¹ tells of a wife's teasing her husband by a flirtation, which she enjoyed with no sympathy for his sufferings until recalled wholly to his side by a physical humiliation to him by his rival. Crowds are inflamed to wild enthusiasm by a football or boxing match, while two chess players contest alone or in the presence of a handful of easily restrained observers.

In so far as emotions and predispositions toward emotionalized attitudes are inherited, the problem is one of ascertaining with individuals the identity, quality, and extent of each, and directing them, developing, subordinating, or replacing them in situations where they are or may be beneficent or harmful. In so far as their cause and control are physical (as distinguished from neural, if such a distinction be allowed) the problems are similar. Having in mind the recent investigations of the effects of ductless-gland secretions, one recognizes here possibilities of revolutionary practices. At any rate, the student of the curriculum hopes for contributions of importance in this field.

¹ *Century*, October, 1924.

Environmental causes. — Environment doubtless also has large effects on the development of emotionalized attitudes. Beginning with entire egocentricity, the individual extends his interests and his feelings outward in response to the kinds of stimuli and responses that he meets. In all probability, as the psychiatrists very properly emphasize, reference should be made to self-satisfactions far more frequently and directly than is the practice of parents or of teachers when seeking explanations of actions and attitudes or effective stimuli for them. Here are involved the instincts and the near-instincts, all of which are related directly to the welfare of the individual ego rather than to social good. Reaction from the foolishly extreme but convenient culture-epoch theory has perhaps gone too far. Certainly the onset of possibilities of parenthood makes important, if it does not initiate, certain emotional attitudes that profoundly affect action. Interests appear and develop into hobbies, both being in varying degrees emotionalized at different age levels. If we had more accurate knowledge of the modifications and extensions of egocentricity and of the contributions of instincts at various age levels, we might again be better directed toward effective curriculum making.

Personal influences. — Certainly the strongest environmental influence on emotional attitudes is that of fellow human beings. It is necessary to consider

separately the influence of individuals and of groups as, in many cases, at least, one or more persons acting as individuals are thought to have given determining direction to emotionalized attitudes. Every one can recall instances in which a person toward whom he had a strong feeling of admiration or of contempt set up in him an ideal, an ambition, a prejudice, or a disposition that persisted with effectiveness long after the apparent original influence passed on. One reflective educator says that he can definitely attribute every important emotionalized attitude in his character to the influence of individuals. Whether this be extreme or not, we are inclined to agree that personal influences, whether we now be conscious of them or not, have often been highly effective in influencing, if not in determining, emotionalized attitudes, which in turn are a large part of what we call character.

Of these personal influences that of father or mother is usually strong. Common observation supports this statement, sometimes noting that the influence of the parent of opposite sex is the more dominant. What common observation frequently overlooks is that the influence of parents is frequently negative, the child in resentment to the overinfluence of his own ego, to a characteristic which is to him offensive, or to other factors, acquiring a highly emotionalized attitude quite the opposite of that manifest in the parent. In the study of pathologic cases this is always recog-

nized by psychiatrists, one of whom sweepingly declares, "As a rule children hate their parents." Watson¹ remarks that the "conditioned love responses, especially those directed toward father or mother, breeding too great dependence upon the parents as they do, are probably the most sinister factors in the whole system of human organization."

Similar strong influences may be consciously or unconsciously exerted by other individuals — pastor, teacher, scout leader, or even some person fortuitously met. We need to know much more than we do of these personal influences, both positive and negative, in order that they may be provided and wisely used for education in the school as well as outside. It is a reasonable hypothesis, which needs proving, that dynamic personalities are more potent than others. If, as seems to be true, personal influence is often potent, in some cases dominant, in setting up emotionalized attitudes, the kind of individual that we select for the direction of children and youths assumes an importance not usually accorded in educational programs. It would be a poor bargain if an individual imparted facts perfectly and yet influenced the pupils so that they had a contempt for the institution that he represented or an antipathy for the subject in which he gave instruction. The practice of private schools, especially in Great Britain, seems in many

¹ Watson, *op. cit.*, p. 235.

cases to recognize the importance of these personal influences in directing emotionalized attitudes more than does the practice of the public schools of the United States.

Social groups. — The first social group, outside the family, in which the child learns to adapt himself to others and in which many emotionalized attitudes are doubtless begun if not established is composed of neighboring children who come together for play. Each brings certain habits and attitudes already set up in the home; but, as every observant parent knows, the potency of mob approval or disapproval is overwhelming. This first group is set aside from those next mentioned because it is determined more by the accidents of environment than by choice of the individual; children are likely to play with their neighbors, whoever they be. Here attitudes of dominance or of submission are exercised; here “complexes” of various kinds may be initiated or strengthened. We need to know with definiteness much more than we do about the effects of early play groups on attitudes that later become assets or liabilities in larger group contacts.

Beyond this there is as long as life lasts a continuous series of elected groups — the gang, the club, the society, the lodge. “Birds of a feather flock together,” but every human plumage is more or less modified by that which others of the covey wear. In these groups

there are powerful determinants of emotionalized attitudes: the gang members are loyal to each other; they despise "snitching," or tale-bearing, even though it can be defended by outsiders with irrefutable logic as necessary for large social good; they prescribe the limits of leadership; and the like. Here mores — *i.e.*, unreasoned folk habits — are established, for general good or ill. It is a reasonable hypothesis that the solidarity of the organization, which varies greatly from group to group, is directly determined by the amount of emotion involved. At what ages are emotionalized attitudes most affected in these social groups? And how? Is a program, like that of the Boy Scouts, consciously devised by directing adults, superior in effectiveness to the undirected development of the gangs themselves? If so, in what respects and to what extent? What have curriculum makers to imitate and to avoid in the programs of Scout troops, Epworth Leagues, summer camps, the Junior Red Cross, and other such organizations?

Critics of America frequently say that the influence of a social group is less here than in the older countries because of our ideal of extreme individualism. In England "It isn't done" forbids; in America it often challenges. The bitter lines of Kipling of the cynic blood in *An American*

"That bids him flout the Law he makes"

madden, but in them we recognize a national characteristic, even if in caricature. Do we wish our children sensitive to conform or eager to rebel? Somewhere in their development they acquire a disposition toward one extreme or the other.

Unifying institutions. — It is worthy of our most serious attention that there are in our country institutions which secure a high degree of uniformity in their products. Notable among them are the Catholic Church in the training of its novices and the academies at Annapolis and West Point in the training of the future officers of our navy and army. A clearly presented account of the former may be found in Brother Chrysostom's *Development of Personality*,¹ from which the following two quotations are made.

"The religious life as expressed in the religious orders and congregations of the Catholic Church is a state, constituted such by the vows; it is therefore a permanent institution, and as such includes: (a) a system of fundamental principles guiding the judgments and correcting the conclusions of those who share its life; (b) an ethical code, determining their outward conduct and in this way influencing to some extent the feelings and emotions that give color to their daily life; (c) an educational agency illustrating in a notable way the principle that solidarity promotes individuality" (p. 32).

¹ McVey, Philadelphia, 1916.

"The novice master gives him instruction, counsel, and commands. On his part the novice is bound to obey. By his entrance into the novitiate he has proclaimed his desire and his intention to renounce material goods by the vow of poverty, to perfect his control over his body by the vow of chastity. Throughout all the period of his probation he must be exercised in obedience; for obedience is the characteristic vow and virtue of the religious. Without obedience no solidarity is possible. Obedience is the perfection of self-mastery. It is the attribute of a strong man, a man of character. Holy Writ assures us that its practice brings victory.

"The social life of the novice is also developed by the action of his fellow-religious. They warn him charitably of his defects; this is the exercise of 'fraternal correction.' They share together their meals, their recreations, and their studies. From day to day he finds his personal views and desires taking on the color of the group of which he has become a member. He becomes more closely identified with the order in spirit and aim and method. The very change of name which is customary in many orders and congregations when the novice is first clothed with the religious habit is but one expression of this community of sentiment. Like the first Christians, the members of a religious institute should have but one heart and one soul" (pp. 58-59).

At Annapolis and at West Point, information being gained from personal interviews with students, graduates, and instructors, uniform and persistent efforts are made from the first day to have the young men conform to the standards of "the officer and the gentleman." They are told what these standards are, what traditional responses to specific situations are expected, and punishment, which may extend to "the silence," the extreme apotheosis of social condemnation, is awarded according to the degree of departure from them. This is all "unofficial," but the system is reported to be followed by the officers in charge as well as by upper classmen. The result is seen in the great uniformity with which the graduates not only think but also feel.

A certain degree of uniformity of thought and feeling among educated people is certainly desirable; how much and in what matters is for agreement among leaders. This is too important a matter to be left to the personal opinion or impression of individuals, especially of those who have not considered the problem in all of its implications. The expressed modern theory undoubtedly tends toward "the development of individuality," which is usually interpreted as *laissez faire*, an abandonment of what educational systems in other countries and the above mentioned in our own have considered desirable.

Satisfiers and annoyers. — By analogy with the

generally accepted theory of the formation of other habits it is reasonable to suspect that attitudes are formed, emotionalized, and permanently set according to the amount of satisfaction that they produce, and that they are discouraged, redirected, and inhibited by consequent annoyance. What these satisfiers and annoyers are is but dimly known. Some, as already suggested, are other people, singly or in groups; but why one person or group strongly emotionalizes an attitude while another does not at all is still to be determined. If we knew the how and the when, we should have a key that fits many curriculum locks. That we now know little must be a challenge rather than a discouragement.

Major dominating attitudes. — That external causes, augmenting such as are inherited, initiate emotionalized attitudes which themselves in turn become causes of other such attitudes can scarcely be doubted. A few strongly felt ideals or prejudices seem to set up a flood of consistent minor ones, all together producing what is called character. We are doubly concerned, therefore, with the formation of these major dominating attitudes which are surcharged with feeling enough to charge and change all our life.

Why is one situation or response met with cold intellectual approval and another similar one with an ardent glow of satisfaction? The rightness of the

judgment may be righteousness, but the intensity of the emotional concomitant is what stimulates to militant action. To illustrate: an individual in some normal situation violates one of the accepted minor mores without obvious serious harm to his fellows. He is tacitly or openly reproved and the matter is dropped. Let his same act come to the focus of public consciousness, however, in a time of emotional excitement, though this may be the result of some very different cause, and immediately the reaction of the group is vigorous or even violent. Many illustrations may be recalled from the period of the late war. One may violate the laws of property with more impunity than those of the person, certainly in a group small enough for knowledge to be intimate. Our maxims, our slogans, our superstitions, all fraught with feeling, show how the currents set.

Emotionalized attitudes and intellectual levels. — To what extent does one create or modify an emotionalized attitude by a conscious intellectual decision? Is this done more on one intellectual level than on another, or consistently on any? It is frequently assumed, as one of the bases of education, that all human beings above infancy first decide and then, if ever, feel. On this assumption, then, there has been almost exclusive emphasis on training the intellect. If it should be found that many or most people when confronted with new situations con-

sistently feel first and then rationalize, or that any considerable number frequently do this, then a redistribution of emphasis must result. Similarly if judgment and feeling are mutually affective.

Vicarious experiences. — We may be reasonably sure that attitudes are formed and emotionalized by satisfactions and annoyances in actual situations. To what extent are they similarly effected and affected by vicarious experiences? Biography, history, literature, and pictures, moving and still, are selected and presented in both the formal and the informal curriculum with a general hope that they will develop and emotionalize attitudes, but we have little trustworthy evidence of the results. If, indeed, we were assured that they are effective, we should have a new responsibility. We are fairly certain that many vicarious experiences do result in highly emotional states: the intellect is inflamed and passions are aroused. If these conditions do not result in some permanent influence on emotionalized readiness to act in real situations, much of our program must be materially revised. The probability is that they do so result. This assumption, too, if proved, should lead to serious curriculum revisions. It would affect both subject matter and method.

When emotionalized attitudes are set. — Finally, when does an attitude acquire, if it ever does, an emotional concomitant? Is there a period in one's devel-

opment when some attitudes, perhaps long and tediously developing, take on a concomitancy of feeling that activates them beyond all others? An hypothesis to be tested is that this change is more frequent in early adolescence (however much the significance of this period is discredited to-day!) than at any other time. Those having intimate contacts with children persist in their belief that at and shortly after pubescence there is a heightening of many of the emotions, that at this time youth is more sensitive to ideals than earlier or later — a belief which leads one to the hypothesis as stated. If it be established, it would have no little weight in determining the place of emphasis on the training of emotionalized attitudes and on their use later in the curriculum.

This hypothesis is in direct contradiction to that held by many psychiatrists, especially by those with Freudian tendencies. They profess to trace many, if not most, pathological emotional states to experiences occurring early in childhood. If their contention be true, it is possible that there still is no important conflict with the hypothesis that for the most part emotional sets are made in adolescence, for pathology may differ in this respect from normality. Of course both suppositions may be true. In that case curriculum makers are especially interested in the distribution to various age and maturity levels of the incidence of the emotionalization of attitudes.

Desirable attitudes. — After this exploration into the sources of emotionalized attitudes, we may ask, *Which ones are desirable in "the good life"?* There are two ways of answering this question: one by securing opinions, the other by considering practices. If intellectual judgments are sought as to which of several score or several hundred "desirable" attitudes should be possessed by the good citizen, all or nearly all will be checked, even though the list would include many about which the judges actually concern themselves in practice very little if at all. Such a list, however, is helpful as narrowing a study of what selected good citizens actually possess. These are by far the more important for the consideration of curriculum makers.

A list of attitudes. — As a beginning for a study of attitudes, a group of students, each one taking some twenty pages of the dictionary, listed all of the adjectives that they considered represent desirable traits of mankind. On this list of nearly 700 some 350 graduate students indicated what they considered the first, second, and third ten in importance. The composite weighted list of thirty adjectives follows.

honest	efficient	reliable
coöperative	appreciative	courageous
democratic	courteous	home-loving
healthy	alert	accurate
thrifty	sincere	progressive
tolerant	conscientious	competent

industrious	just	loyal
intelligent	resourceful	capable
public-spirited	self-controlled	truthful
dependable	trustworthy	tactful

Although this list of adjectives represents the composite judgment of a large number of experienced and earnest educators, it is not presented, of course, as in any sense complete or final in its validity. It is, however, highly suggestive of traits or attitudes that should be the concern of education, formal or informal, at some time or other in a child's development. It should be noted that these adjectives are not supposed to represent the qualities which taken together are judged as constituting "the good man." They are not selected for that purpose. Several of the adjectives represent phases of the same quality — *trustworthy*, *dependable*, and *reliable*, for examples.

Definitions. — A consideration of these thirty adjectives immediately reveals that each one may have several rather distinct and many different shades of meaning. (*Clean*, for example, may apply to the physical, the intellectual, or the moral self.) Any one of these phases of meaning may have been dominant in the mind of each judge; one may be of great importance in character, while another is of much less. The significant definition is the one that each of us accepts in his practice, which, perforce, he considers most satisfactory for successful living.

One way of getting at accepted working definitions of such attributes is to secure honest responses from representative good citizens as to what they actually attempt to practice. This is exceedingly difficult, for self-deception and confusion of ideals and practices in moral matters are the commonest of phenomena. An exploratory study has been made on the following plan: First, a number of statements were invented for each attribute involving a range from the most nearly ideal, in the mind of the investigator, to the opposite end of the scale. As an illustration, for *accuracy* some fifteen or twenty statements such as the following were prepared: "I am so disturbed by an inaccurate statement, even when it apparently promises no harm to anyone, that I cannot rest until it is corrected;" "I see no harm in attributing an incident to someone who was not involved in it, for the sake of fun, even though it makes him uncomfortable;" and "I do not hesitate to make an inaccurate statement in reply to an unjustifiable question." Of course each statement of this kind brings to a reader a setting from his own experience that differs more or less from that brought to every one else, but the responses doubtless increase the definiteness of the meaning of the adjective.

Approval by action. — As a second step of the study a number of people were asked to consider all the statements and then to check those corresponding

with their usual practice. In order to secure responses as honest as possible the purpose of the study was explained and entire anonymity was in several ways guaranteed. This step revealed some notable deviations of practice from ideals, but on the whole the agreement of profession and habit was close. Results of majority responses throw light on what good citizens pragmatically accept as ideals of attitude and action.

Emotional concomitants. — All this has, so far, been entirely intellectual: judgments have been recorded without indication of accompanying emotions. A third step of the exploratory study attempted to ascertain about which of these attitudes good citizens have strong feeling. Into the list of adjectives were inserted an equal number of antonyms, and new respondents were asked to indicate for and against which of the entire list they felt most strongly. It is interesting to note that most people have stronger feelings of revulsion than of attraction; we are more likely bitterly to resent tardiness and filth than to thrill with approval of promptness and cleanliness. Reasons for this need not here be discussed. When both an adjective and its antonym have been checked by a number of respondents we may be reasonably sure that we are on the trail of an emotionalized attitude important in the lives of people generally considered superior. The study was too exploratory and restricted to make its results worth reporting now.

It is outlined merely to indicate one of several methods that may be used to secure a better answer to the question what emotionalized attitudes are considered desirable than the arbitrary expression of opinion by some individual. This is an inviting field for investigation. Established results must perforce furnish valuable curriculum material.

The concern of schools. — *Which of the important emotionalized attitudes are the concern of the schools?* Obviously no list can be attempted until the preceding question is answered; and, with equal obviousness, the inclusiveness of the list will depend upon one's conception of the scope of the school's responsibility as well as on the varying effectiveness of local environmental factors. Of course a list of emotionalized attitudes that are an important concern of the school in one community will differ from that in another, for the degree of homogeneity of a population, its ethical culture, and its concern in the homes with moral training vary widely. This is one of the matters in which the adaptation of the curriculum to the needs of each group of children — indeed of each child — must be liberal. Some central agency, which can be none other than the school, must for effective education insure that each and every child develop somewhere and at some time the emotional attitudes that have been empirically found essential and even those considered highly important to society.

Modification and direction. — *How may emotionalized attitudes be created, developed, modified, and directed toward beneficent action?* If it be admitted that emotionalized attitudes are important, that some are desirable, and that of these a number are a concern of education, formal or informal, then the questions stated above become a practical challenge. It is common, when the matter is presented, to hear, "Direct training is seldom, if ever, effective"; yet the fact is that parents and those teachers who are interested in more than textual instruction are constantly endeavoring to develop character, which is the result of emotionalized attitudes predisposing and stimulating to conduct. Any practice of long standing in society deserves the most careful consideration. Empiricism is often wrong in conclusions drawn from single or a small number of experiences; but persistent practice of the ages, the composite empirical judgments of thousands, is a shrewd approximation of truth.¹ Theognis in the late sixth century B.C., after writing

"To rear a child is easy, but to teach
Morals and manners is beyond our reach,"

immediately attempted the task by his maxims.

¹ The psychologist has shown that the group ranking of lines of so nearly the same length that each respondent is skeptical of his own judgment is in close conformity with the results of careful measurement.

About few matters are men, even wise philosophers, so inclined to be dogmatic rather than scientific. Empiricism is frequently contradicted by plausible theory. The importance of the matter deserves careful experimentation consequent to understanding and reflection.

Following are some means that may in varying degrees be effective. They are stated not as an answer to the questions proposed, but as a stimulus to a more nearly complete list of means, all of which should be tested empirically and scientifically.

1. *Precept.* — The commonest empirical means is precept. Some precepts are wholly or almost wholly intellectual, "Tie the knot this way"; others carry with them varying degrees of appeal to the emotions. For example:

"Early to bed,
Early to rise,
Makes a man healthy,
Wealthy, and wise."

This has been dinned into the ears of childhood so long and so continually that many, perhaps most, adults to-day, disregarding the failure of the promised rewards, feel that the early riser is clothed with some sort of virtue. Only on reflection do they realize that, as John Stuart Mill said, one is often as a result conceited in the morning and dull in the afternoon. Royce is one of those who has emphasized the

potency of precepts, and he has shown, too, how contradictory many of the traditional ones are. Of course each one has in it a germ of truth, sometimes the whole truth for a particular situation. But the conflicts challenge alike the philosopher and the curriculum maker who has a scientific bent.

“Conventional morality, as it is usually taught to us, consists of a maze of precepts. Sometimes they tend to come into conflict with another. Be just; but also be kind. Be generous; but also be strict in demanding what is your due. Live for others; but be careful of your own dignity, and assert your rights. Love all mankind; but resent insults, and be ready to slay the enemies of your country. Take no thought for the morrow; but be careful to save and to insure. Cultivate yourself; but always sacrifice yourself. Forget yourself; but never be so thoughtless in conduct that others shall justly say, ‘You have forgotten yourself.’ Be moderate in all things; but know no moderation in your devotion to righteousness.”¹

The precepts most of interest to us are the saws, maxims, and proverbs, intellectually sound, unsound, and partly sound, which express the mores of a people.² When the mores of our civilization are listed, as they have never yet been fully, though Sumner presents four general rubrics, a comparison with them

¹ Royce, *Philosophy of Loyalty*, p. 149.

² Discussed on p. 125.

must be made of folk proverbs that retain their popularity; and from the number approved by reason some will be chosen for experiment that will inform us of their potency through instruction to effect and affect emotionalized attitudes.

2. *Formal instruction.* — A second possibility of means is direct, formal instruction — systematic elaboration, as it were, of a text, which may or may not also be expressed in a popular proverb. Under this head come courses in philosophy, ethics, morals and manners, and conduct. Some of their phases, perhaps most, have been wholly intellectual; indeed there must be a rational basis here for everything that is taught. But, as previously assumed, the more the principles are emotionalized, the more likely they are to find expression in conduct, even of the intelligentia. Perhaps the most popular form of this organized instruction is in Sunday schools, though secondary schools have during the past few years initiated much instruction of this kind. We all have hopes, faiths, and opinions, but we need information as to the effects of formalized instruction concerning conduct.

3. *Incidental instruction.* — Closely allied to the means of formal instruction is that incidental to the teaching of other subjects. Though often associated with untenable faith in general and automatic transfer and in discipline, there are phases so reasonable that they invite study of results. To what extent

through the study of mathematics, French, physics, or history are attitudes of accuracy, of sympathy, of patience, of tolerance, for example, created, developed, modified, or directed? To what extent are they emotionalized so as to make desired action likely and satisfying? Certainly the constant effort of tens of thousands of teachers should be stimulated, directed, and rewarded by something more than hope and faith. Certainly the expenditure of time, patience, and money should be justified, modified, or abandoned.

4. *Personal example.* — Another means commonly used is personal example. There is reasonable belief (which is less assured than knowledge) that emotionalized attitudes are strongly affected by the influence, conscious or unconscious, of persons toward whom youth has a strong feeling of affection, admiration, or contempt. But how and under what conditions this comes about we do not know. An ideal example that is more or less intimately associated with youth and more or less constantly before its eyes may apparently be ineffective, while a mere stranger with incidental contact may influence it profoundly and permanently. A study of a number of histories of emotionalized attitudes, produced by introspection and memory, should give leads that investigators can follow. A preliminary study of this nature shows, however, that such histories must be most critically considered, since disturbed by other emotionalized attitudes many people

are incapable of ascertaining and of recording the facts. What a changed attitude toward the selection of teachers, toward the whole matter of salaries, would result if we were assured that those in charge of our youth actually affect or determine character to an important extent by personal influence!

5. *Experience followed by satisfaction.* — A fifth means, which is consistent with current popular philosophy and with what we know of psychology, is experience followed by satisfaction. Children and youths are put into, or encouraged to develop for themselves, situations identical with or similar to those typical of life, and satisfactions are insured by the direction of their instructors. We need to know to what extent and under what conditions this means is effective; how, if it proves especially fruitful of results, it may be improved; what are its weaknesses which, despite all effort, sometimes apparently permit an undesired and maleficent attitude to be set up and strongly maintained; whether satisfiers are more effective in producing emotionalized attitudes than annoyers, or less so; the effect on pupils of occasional and of constant consciousness of the ends sought by the instructors; the distance from the situation at which the satisfier or the annoyer at various maturity levels may be effective; and whether the experiences must be actual rather than wholly or in part vicarious.

Martz and Kinneman¹ state: "In order that any action may be rational, it is necessary that the result of the change shall follow the change in a definite manner and in a short time. There must be no question as to the relation of the cause and the effect. . . . Rational selection demands a quick, definite test." This opinion, which sounds reasonable, may similarly hold true for emotionalized attitudes; but it seems proper to suspect that with increasing maturity of pupils the interval between a response and its results may be gradually lengthening without impairment of results. A kindergarten class will work enthusiastically only for a party not more remote than next week, while an adult may with even greater emotional satisfaction pay the premium on an insurance policy that will profit others only after his death.

An hypothesis of the effectiveness of vicarious experience is held by those who teach literature and history as means of affecting conduct through emotionalized attitudes. But again we have little or no positive knowledge of what the results are. Much would seem to depend on whether or not the selected material is so taught that the learner participates imaginatively and emotionally in the incidents presented, that he puts himself into the presented experience. If we were assured of character results from the study of literature, history, music, and other

¹ *Social Science for Teachers*, p. 26.

forms of art, curriculum makers would make selections with far greater care and with somewhat different emphasis on criteria than is now the practice.

6. *Ritual*. — The final means of affecting emotionalized attitudes to be listed, though other important ones may exist, is ritual. This is at the opposite extreme from intellectualized activity on the part of the participant. Of it Sumner¹ says:

“The process by which mores are developed and established is ritual. Ritual is so foreign to our mores that we do not recognize its power. In primitive society it is the prevailing method of activity, and primitive religion is entirely a matter of ritual. Ritual is the perfect form of drill and of the regulated habit which comes from drill. Acts which are ordained by authority and are repeated mechanically without intelligence run into ritual. If infants and children are subjected to ritual they never escape from its effects through life. Galton says that he was, in early youth, in contact with the Mohammedan ritual idea that the left hand is less worthy than the right, and that he never overcame it. We see the effect of ritual in breeding, courtesy, politeness, and all forms of prescribed behavior. Etiquette is social ritual. Ritual is not easy compliance with usage; it is strict compliance with detailed and punctilious rule. It admits of no exception or devi-

¹ *Folkways*, pp. 60 ff.

ation. The stricter the discipline, the greater the power of ritual over action and character. In the training of animals and the education of children it is the perfection, inevitableness, invariableness, and relentlessness of routine which tells. They should never experience any exception or irregularity. Ritual is connected with words, gestures, symbols, and signs. Associations result, and, upon a repetition of the signal, the act is repeated, whether the will assents or not."

Though used by churches, lodges, military, and other organizations of mankind, its persistence indicating a belief in its efficacy, we really know very little about its results and the technique that proves most effective. Indeed we seem never to have considered very seriously what amount of ritual is intellectually respectable, or for what levels of intellect it is most effective, if there be differences. The intelligentsia patronizingly resign ritual to the lowly and then themselves seek a patent of nobility or strut in cap and gown. Some ritual there is in our schools, but not because of a conscious introduction to secure modifications of conduct.¹ If it is effective in other phases of social relationships, it may be found to be

¹ Dr. F. H. Hayward, of the London County Council Schools, has made an interesting attempt to utilize ritualism in secular moral instruction. See his *Book of School Celebrations* and *A Second Book of School Celebrations*, published by Herbert Russell, London.

of much more importance than we realized in formal education, particularly as that is conceived to relate to conduct rather than merely to academic learning. In the language of the Yankee, but with meaning different from his, we "want to know."

It is highly probable that each of these means is variously effective with different individuals. Why? Is it possible for scientists in education to ascertain the key to what means will produce the best results in pupils of differing intelligence, maturity, temperament, and previous training? If so, a tremendous field for practical work will lie fallow and inviting.

CHAPTER III

MORES

ANOTHER phase of education that must be considered by the curriculum maker interested in the whole of life is the folkways, the manner of action generally accepted in a social group — nation, sect, or family. To include these common manners Professor Sumner invented the convenient term *mores*. They are common and powerful, though seldom discussed in relation to the education, formal or informal, of our own children.

Definition. — “The mores,” says Sumner,¹ “are the ways of doing things which are current in a society to satisfy human needs and desires, together with the faiths, notions, codes, and standards of well living which inhere in those ways, having a genetic connection with them.” Later² he states that “the mores are social ritual in which we all participate unconsciously. . . . For the great mass of mankind as to all things, and for all of us for a great many things, the rule to do as all do suffices. . . . If we had to form judgments as to all these cases before we could

¹ *Folkways*, pp. 60-61.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 62.

act in them, and were forced always to act rationally, the burden would be unendurable. Beneficent use and wont save us this trouble."

Though Sumner defines *mores* as including "a judgment that they are conducive to societal welfare," and "the philosophical and ethical generalizations as to societal welfare which are suggested by them, and inherent in them, as they grow," he presents many illustrations that now lack any such rationalization. In the discussion that follows *mores* will be used to mean the ways of doing things, whether rational to other people or not, that are generally, and as a rule tacitly and unquestioningly, followed by a group, usually of some considerable size. In brief, they are group habits, sanctioned and approved.

Foreign mores easily recognized. — The mores of foreign, especially of primitive, people are the ones most easily recognized and most commonly discussed by earlier sociologists and anthropologists. Certain savages affect the tattoo. An Indian mother binds a board on the forehead of her infant to flatten it for the sake of beauty. Hottentot women wear a head cloth, which they will not remove. Yakut women are angry if a man stare at their feet, though they are naked to the waist without shame. In Behar, Hindostan, the women wear brass rings on their legs. The Somali exploit the old to work as long as possible and then cast them out to die of hunger. Chinese

women, whose feet have been deformed by binding, consider it indecent to expose them. German students fought saber duels for causes that were trivial and gloried in their face scars. Frenchmen greet their male friends with kisses on the cheek. A Chinese to show honor puts on his hat and removes his shoes, whereas we reverse the custom. In Hindu society a son always lives with his father; he may not speak, though he may write, his mother's name; and he may not talk directly with his parents about getting married.

These illustrations, drawn from various sources, are of the concrete and may at first thought appear trivial. But careful reading of the literature, and reflection no less, show that they are merely typical of many practices which, approved by the social group, may not be violated with impunity. Punishment, varying from social scorn and ostracism to the physical, is swift and certain in proportion as the group has accepted the practice as proper and has accorded to it a degree of feeling. Beyond such concrete customs as have been cited the mores extend to habits of thought, attitudes, and prejudices which are even more important, though illustration need not be attempted in brief space.

Mores common among us. — It is a common habit to be amused at the mores of other people and to despise their "senseless" devotion to what usually

appears irrational. But among us mores are just as common and, in many instances, of just as little rationality. We follow the fashions, often ugly and unhygienic, in dress; Gentiles remove their hats on entering a church, while the orthodox Jew keeps his on; we shake hands in greeting a friend; we eat foods which are taboo by other nations. "The French like brains and other special parts. . . . The Anglo-Saxons, as a rule, stick to muscle cuts of meat. McCollum has shown that this type of animal food is, however, by no means as nutritious as the organs like the liver, spleen, lungs, and other internal parts. But as a rule they are not used, for we lack the accustomedness to them. To the great majority of mankind the idea of eating horseflesh is repulsive, yet numbers of people in various parts of Europe have conquered the initial repugnance and are finding this animal food quite as pleasant as cow's meat. Snail soup is relished in Italy, while down at Marseilles gourmands feast on angleworms and find them appetizing." ¹

A woman wears without impropriety when swimming in a public place a costume that is considered indecent elsewhere. In certain strata of society and sections of the country she may smoke a cigarette,

¹ Levine, "Why We Should Be More Interested in Nutrition," *Scientific Monthly*, January, 1926. See also Austin Clark's *Animals of Land and Sea*, p. 27 *et passim*.

but that she should be addicted to a pipe is unthinkable. However, old women of lowly station used to smoke a pipe without arousing the adverse criticism of their friends. In one group a form of dancing is popular; in another it is wholly taboo. A man may call another a liar only through euphemism or be guilty of ill breeding. A cow is milked and a horse mounted only from the left side. The useful *mos* of turning to the right when meeting others on the sidewalk is unfortunately being broken down, chiefly perhaps by women who are "window shopping." And there is a question which is the stronger — "What is worth doing is worth doing well" or "That's good enough."

Mores are potent. — In other and more rational matters one may find the mores equally potent. A public official is mistrusted, and yet there is an unreasoned faith in governmental activity. Sumner¹ thought that "Popular education and certain faiths about popular education are in the mores of our time. . . . Our faith in the power of book learning is excessive and unfounded. It is a superstition of the age." In another place² he wrote: "The rights of conscience, the equality of all men before the law, the separation of church and state, religious toleration, freedom of speech and of the press, popular edu-

¹ *Folkways*, pp. 628-629.

² *The Challenge of Facts and Other Essays*, p. 353.

cation, are vital traditions of the American people. They are not brought in question; they form the stock of firm and universal convictions on which our national life is based; they are ingrained into the character of our people and you can assume in any controversy that an American will admit their truth. . . . We never hear them disputed and it is only when we observe how difficult it is for some foreign nations to learn them that we perceive that they are not implanted by nature in the human mind."

Our own mores are seldom considered and recorded as such: they are too common, too much taken for granted as natural and inevitable ordinarily to challenge attention. Only when we are confronted by mores different from our own — for example, those peculiar to other sections of our country or to other strata of society — or when we are confused by doubt as to what we should do to conform with convention do we think about the matter. Stories or sketches of "how the other half lives" illustrate that the first condition has often existed; books of etiquette, which are popular with those not to the manner born and with the immature who dread the embarrassment of being conspicuous through nonconformity, give evidence of the second. Often when our "ways of doing things" are brought to the focus of attention, especially when they are challenged by others, we

defend them with the phrase "They are the laws of God and of men" — and so not to be impeached.

Many hostile mores similar in significance. — It is surprising to find how many hostile mores are identical in significance, though superficially different. Nose-rubbing, hand-shaking, and cheek-kissing are essentially the same, merely a method of expressing courteous greeting; as, indeed, *very*, *awfully*, and *damn* are intensives used in different mores to indicate what a good time one had. But one may not be substituted for the other without more or less offense. There is variation of the mores by locality, by cultural groups, and by intelligence levels; but who can say where they are more or less potent? ". . . Most of us live for the most part in the mores, acting unconsciously after their prescriptions; and all of us live to a very large degree in them; that is, we are all mainly creatures of use and wont. Few of us have a positive, well-thought-out plan of life, whether it be right or wrong. We marvel at the self-directed life of a Goethe, and assign it forthwith to genius. We meet emergencies one or two at a time, acting in them for the most part without much perspective beyond the case in hand. There are too many exigencies for us to give much thought to each, and so we go on by rule of thumb, that is, in the mores. So long as we slide over vicissitudes, or slip past, that satisfies us. If our mores effect for us a painless passage through life, we have

no idea of criticizing or altering them; we let well enough alone. Every man, no matter how enlightened, has his point where it does not seem worth while to cerebrare any further, and he 'takes his chance.' A Newton could concentrate 'a little longer' than the rest of his fellows; the savage leaves off somewhat earlier in the process, just as the child does; but we are all human beings with minds that tire and attention that flags. Then we fall back unconsciously on the ways that have come out of the experience of the race." ¹

A cause of conflict. — The mores of one group are sometimes ridiculous or contemptible to another, causing scorn and inevitable bad feeling when the groups are thrown into close contact. Moreover, they are usually exaggerated by report. Numerous instances may be recalled from the late war when troops encamped near their allies were offended or amused by foreign mores. Epithets like "frog-eaters" applied to neighbors evidence an attitude that does not make for amity. Seldom is there a calm consideration of whether or not the mores of others are superior, especially for the people who practice them. When not exciting scorn or ridicule, different mores often stimulate an unreasonable endeavor to persuade or to force the offenders to conform to the practices and attitudes of the more powerful group. This is called

¹ Keller, *Societal Evolution*, pp. 101-102.

meddling or altruistic zeal, according to one's point of view. We have all read of missionaries who spent untold effort to persuade negroes of the tropics comfortable in their nakedness to don the clothing of the north temperate zone, and who have substituted Christianity for the religion long held and practiced by "unbelievers." At home or abroad failure to convert others to our mores, whether rational or merely conventional, tempts us to attribute their non-receptivity to ignorance or lack of mental, moral, or social development. Their "perversity" has not infrequently led to bitterness and even to conflict that they may be forced to "better" ways. Lord Acton is authority for the statement that more wars have resulted from religious differences — that is, conflicts of highly emotionalized mores — than from all other causes.

The sources of mores. — The sources of the mores are various. Some — many, indeed — are rational, obviously based on the intellectual essentials of happiness. (Many more seem so until one recognizes that some groups are happy, or think themselves happy, without them.) The mores thus based are the ones of most concern to education. Some of them have been incorporated into formal curricula of home, church, or school. All of them should be. Reason alone, however, finds it difficult to establish mores; it needs the assistance of its more stimulating

sister, feeling. There was abundant reason, supported by obvious self-interest, to secure the adoption into the mores of pure-food practices before they were enacted into the statutes, but in all probability a novel that exaggerated nauseating incidents in the packing plants was a more effective factor.

Other mores, which developed out of rational practice, are now followed blindly or have been so modified in time that they can no longer be associated with a reasonable origin. Such are the mores that lead man to wear buttons on the sleeves of a coat, to convoy a lady on his left arm, to rise at the entrance of one highly respected, or to be "properly" expectant at a story beginning "One day Mike and Pat" or "A farmer named Ole Olson." Certain practices ordained for sound reason by that great hygienist Moses later became mores pure and simple, seldom related to their original cause. Indeed the cause — as that pork eating produced disease — may have been entirely removed. Often, as the rational sanction of mores is weakened or lost, they become increasingly imperative and arbitrary, sometimes breaking by their own weight as much as by rational opposition or the competition of other practices. Illustration may be found in some of the mores of strict religious sects. "If the limits are too narrow, there is an overflow into vice and abuse, as was proved by the seventeenth-century Puritanism in England. If the limit

is too remote, there is no discipline, and the regulation fails of its purpose. Then a corruption of manners ensues."

Many mores now irrational. — Whether originating in intelligent cause or not, most of the mores in any group, especially the smaller ones, are now irrational. They are followed as a matter of course, and only if challenged are they assigned justifying reasons. Sometimes this cannot be done by any amount of rationalizing. The mores of fashions are an illustration. One has only to review those that have come and gone under his own observation — hoopskirts, bustles, wide, long, hobbled, and short skirts, leg-o'-mutton, tight, and no sleeves — to see how irrational most of them are. Nor is it different with the fashions of men, though they are usually more persistent. One of the mores of certain peoples is to follow the fashions. Not to be "in the fashion" is to incur the disapprobation of others in the peculiar group.

Occasionally mores have developed that are positively harmful. Such, for examples, are the preference by the Chinese for polished rice, which not only is far less nutritive than the unpolished but also is injurious to health, causing the disease beri-beri; the sacrifice by ancient peoples of youths chosen for beauty and strength; and in modern times certain attitudes toward marriage and birth, which may not be specifically cited without the probability of arous-

ing emotional resentment that would divert the line of thought being developed. These harmful mores are usually offshoots of other mores superior in power because carrying with them larger amounts of feeling. The history of religion furnishes many illustrations. Ultimately the harmful mores give way as their competitors weaken or as natural feeling, like parental affection or personal comfort, asserts itself.

The importance of mores. — The importance of the mores may have been clouded by the apparent triviality of some of the illustrations cited, illustrations chosen that they might not unduly disturb the judgments of the reader by involving his emotionalized attitudes, as might happen if citations were made of the mores of sex, property, and individual rights. But they are of great importance none the less. In the first place, they not merely condition action, they determine it: the mores are ways of *doing* things. "They do not stimulate to thought, but the contrary. . . . They are not questions, but answers, to the problems of life." In this respect, then, they may be cogent deterrents to desired and rational changes. "The mores (*Sitten*) are, before any beginning of reflection, the regulators of the political, social, and religious behavior of the individual. Conscious reflection is the worst enemy of the mores, because mores begin unconsciously and pursue unconscious purposes, which are recognized by reflection often only after

long and circuitous processes, and because their expediency often depends on the assumption that they will have general acceptance and currency, uninterfered with by reflection.”¹

A criterion of action. — In many instances with all, and in the majority of instances with some, the mores are the criteria of right action. “What is true of the individual is even more marked of the group. Seldom does a group deliberately set out to apply rational criticism to its mores. Our sex taboo is largely irrational, inherited as it is through religion from dogmatic propositions of people who had no authority for us. A Hindu lends his wife to get good offspring. This may be rational on the face of it, but it is also shocking, being against our mores, and most of us would not even tolerate the discussion of its rationality. There is probably a good reason for our repugnance, but we do not stop to reason. It seems rational in every way that a widower should marry his deceased wife’s sister, especially if he has young children. Such a second wife would be least likely to turn out a ‘viper to the first brood’; and there is, of course, no more question of incest than there was in the first marriage. But the vicissitudes of the Deceased Wife’s Sister Bill in England show how difficult it was to make reason heard, even in so clear a case

¹ Hartmann, *Phänom. des sittl. Bewusstseins*, p. 73, quoted by Sumner, pp. 59–60.

where the mores were open to criticism. In short, as Sumner says, the mores can make anything right and true and exempt it from criticism.”¹

An economy and a stabilizer. — To the credit of the mores, it must be recognized that they are an economy in that they short-circuit thought in habitual responses and that “they give stability to the social order when they are well understood, regular, and undisputed.” Keller² writes: “It is essential to the coherence of an amalgamated society that there shall be agreement upon what are conceived by powerful combinations of citizens to be the vital issues, or else there will be constant tension and civil strife; the indispensable condition is that the contentment over the provisions for what are conceived to be the paramount interests of all shall be profound enough to relegate the local interests of some to a position of minor importance.”

A means of integration. — In large measure the mores are responsible for integration; they hold together the members of a society that practice them, for, to repeat what Follett³ says, “Genuine integration occurs in the sphere of activities, and not of ideas or wills. . . . Integration of activities usually out-runs integration of ideas.” Sect, denomination, fraternal organization, social caste all have their mores,

¹ *Societal Evolution*, pp. 102-103.

² *Societal Evolution*, p. 81.

³ *Creature Experience*, pp. 150 and 176.

their ritual, their "beliefs," their attitudes, and their prejudices that distinguish them from other sect, denomination, fraternal organization, or social caste. The intellect functions here chiefly to rationalize what the mores have established in feeling. Keller¹ says: "In a general way political parties grow up about the nucleus of a common interest that is felt rather than reasoned out. Party affiliations are largely in the mores and are traditional. They are the expression of an interest or interests held in common by smaller groups which are willing to unite for their realization. In other respects such uniting groups may have very different codes; 'politics make strange bedfellows.' However, political parties are likely to comprise those who have a number of interests in common, or think they have, and so are often coextensive with classes or even geographical sections." But the prepotency of mores in holding an individual in such groups can often be seen by a clear-headed thinker who challenges him to justify his membership or who attempts to wean him away.

Changes strengthening the importance of mores.
— Because societal groups change from those of the past — in some cases strengthening, in others weakening — and because migration from one community or even state to another seems to be increasingly common, the importance of education's concern with the

¹ *Loc. cit.*, p. 106.

mores is emphasized. That such changes are going on is clearly shown by Ross.¹ "Now these natural bonds, that were many and firm when the rural neighborhood or the village community was the type of aggregation, no longer bind men as they must be bound in the huge and complex aggregates of to-day. Kinship has lost its old sacred significance. Social erosion has worn down the family until now it consists of only parents and young. From being a sacrament marriage has become a contract terminable almost at pleasure. Nearness of dwelling means less in the country and nothing in the town. For the intimacy of the countryside the city offers only a 'multitudinous desolation.' Frequent change of domicile hinders the growth of strong local feelings. The householder has become a tenant, the workingman a bird of passage. Loose touch-and-go acquaintanceships take the place of those close and lasting attachments that form between neighbors that have long lived, labored, and pleased together. The power of money rends the community into classes incapable of feeling keenly with one another. Even while we are welding it, the social mass laminates. Everywhere we see the march of differentiation. Everywhere we see the local group — the parish, commune, neighborhood, or village — decaying, or else developing beyond the point of real community.

¹ *Social Control*, pp. 433-435.

"Of course this is not all the story. If the molecules of the local group are jarred asunder, it is partly because they fall under influences which make them vibrate in vaster unisons. Local solidarity perishes because bonds of fellowship are woven which unite a man to distant coreligionists, or fellow-partisans, or fellow-craftsmen, or members of the same social class. In this way fresh social tissue forms and replaces, perhaps, the tissue that dies. . . .

"I freely confess that not all the new communities are of this narrow gauge. Certain broad-gauge, inclusive communities are growing up. The famous old groups — the Semitic 'tribe,' the Greek 'city,' the Teutonic 'kindred,' the mediaeval 'town,' the New England 'settlement' — were small; but now we see growing up a civic, metropolitan, national, or even racial communion binding men into mammoth aggregates. As the means of communication improve, as the school and the press grow mighty, and as man dares to look up a little from his engrossing daily task, the ease of comprehending distant persons and situations enables fellowship to overleap the limits of personal contact. The man of the street understands the far men of the field or the mine or the sea. Sentiment, ignoring latitude and longitude, welds men into vast bodies and facilitates the growth of orderly relations."

In large and small groups. — The larger the group,

the smaller the number of mores peculiar to it and the more important these are. The mores of occidental civilization are fewer than those of democracy, the mores of democracy fewer than those of any family. Violation of the mores, when known, is punished by the group holding them, sometimes merely by expressed displeasure, sometimes by banishment or even by execution, according to the degree to which feeling is associated with the attitude. For illustration one may imagine what would happen if a white man attempted to introduce his negro wife into a social group that had previously welcomed him unmarried in Massachusetts, Ohio, and Alabama. Inasmuch as refuge may usually be had in a large group following different mores, those of the small one have potency only in proportion as an individual desires its good will or continued identity with it. Many a young man or woman has left home because unwilling longer to tolerate mores of the family, such as dress, worship, or paternal control; while others have endured mores that they found unpleasant either because they possessed no means of entering other groups with different practices or else because other ties bound them until at last they accepted the mores and imposed them on others.

Youth needs guidance. — Youth is interested in the mores of the group in which he is or in which he desires to be in order that he may not be conspicuous

by his violation of some approved practice and that he may be acceptable to it. He reads, he looks, he listens, he learns, and he conforms; then what becomes of the individuality that he has been told to cherish and develop? The philosophies of conformity and of individuality, like the doctrines of interest and effort, are only apparently in conflict. In extreme each is bad. But, as Bagley has said, there lies not between but above them a truth to which both may make their valued and essential contribution. Youth needs guidance as to which of the mores are respectable, which are in his day and time conducive to societal welfare: these he must accept, subordinating any conflicting individuality. He needs guidance, too, concerning the degree to which he must accept others that are not so rational because a failure to do so would prejudice his chances to accomplish more important things. When principle is at stake and he may not conform without sacrifice of character he should be guided to discriminate and to rebel. Shall his elders not impart to him some of their philosophy of conformity and of adaptation that he may preserve and develop his individual self and at the same time not offend, as youth is prone to do, one or more of the groups in which he must find his happiness while contributing to that of others?

Youth learns by precept and by example. — The young learn the mores of their own group directly by

example and by precept. They observe their elders in action — their diction, their manners, their courtesies, their expressed antipathies and ideals; and so long as these seem to succeed, to bring satisfactions and approval from others, they are accepted and imitated. More than this, the elders enforce conformity: the heavy hand, the stern rebuke, the gentle command are constant and recurrent factors, more potent probably than the tacit approval of following the group custom. Precept is also constant: "Take off your hat in the house," "Shut the door after you," "Pity the poor," and the thousand other phrases repeated so frequently by the parent that they cause the mores of the child. Especially are precepts potent when they are couched in epigram or decorated with rhyme. Who has not accepted "A bad beginning makes a good ending," questioning it only in later years, or "Haste makes waste," without considering that it is only a half-truth? Probably no precepts are more effective in orthodox religious families than quotations from the Bible. Quoted with veneration and awe, they carry all the accumulated respect that has formerly been built up for God. In such families Biblical texts are usually accepted unquestioningly, and so build up, support, and maintain a large part of the important mores.

Ideals grow out of mores. — Gradually in the young there are developed ideals of life. Inasmuch as youth

is incompetent and largely undirected to consider life in its larger aspects or as a whole, these ideals naturally grow out of the mores of the group: such and such things are not done by a Smith, by a gentleman, by an American, by a Christian; such and such other things are proper, right, or admirable for him to do. Though they may be violated by many of the clan, they remain as ideals and doubtless are of tremendous potency in influencing conduct, not only in the formative period but also, to a greater or less extent, throughout life. When the ideals which grow out of the mores of the group are developed with a large amount of concomitant feeling, as they are wont to be if the mores are strongly held, and more or less consistently obeyed, and if violation is followed by severe condemnation, they are probably the strongest and most persistent character influences in life. All religious and character training has recognized this, and has sought to inculcate emotionalized attitudes during the period when feelings are strong. If, as many believe, the home and the church for various reasons are becoming less effective in their training of youth, then other phases of education must be increasingly concerned. A *laissez-faire* policy will lead to social disaster. We are already so far gone in disjunction that any single individual who felt the responsibility for unity would bend every effort to secure common knowledge, common ideals, common

attitudes, and common prejudices, all leading to satisfying action. Such a one every parent and every teacher is in part. And the mores, "the ways of doing things" satisfactorily to the group, are one of the means, perhaps the most important one, that we have for effective use. An ideal is a conscious mos. Acting according to a generally accepted ideal, even more than according to an individual one, brings satisfactions that insure, or tend to insure, continuous repetition.

Vicarious experiences. — Youth learns the mores of other people partly by direct observation, but perhaps to an even larger extent he learns both mores and emotionalized attitudes indirectly through reading, attending the theater, and seeing motion pictures. This is one reason, and a most important one, why education should be concerned to an extent and in a manner that it never has yet been with training in the selection and reading of newspapers, magazines, and literature, and with training in the selection, evaluation, and appreciation of the spoken and the pictured drama. As maintained elsewhere, action is most likely to be modified when the emotions or the affective attitudes are involved, and involved they assuredly are by newspaper accounts of scandals (that is what gives them "news values"), by literature that is truly appreciated, by the drama or "movie" that thrills. Because youth is not always discriminating

and because writers frequently follow the easier path and appeal to the coarser emotions, he may possibly, if undirected by wise instruction, emulate the weaknesses of his hero as the virtues. Colonel Newcome's gentleness and purity do not always appeal as does Captain Costigan's ribald lewdness. There seems to be a real and an important challenge here for education to select for study by youth the verbal and pictorial presentations of life that convey with concomitant feeling desired mores, and so to teach the selections that their appreciation may affect attitudes and conduct.

Motion pictures. — Motion pictures are especially important because they have been so generally neglected by formal education, because of their great popularity, and because the directors of films have had in mind quite different ends. An alarming number of pictures present actors who possess luxuries that make them appear to the indiscriminating in every respect ideal. Limousines, expensive clothes, magnificent houses, and lavish luxury are too frequently associated with the drinking of alcoholic liquor and with sexual immorality. Admiring and desiring the luxurious possessions, youth is likely to admire and desire the associated vices as well. The conventional mores — and in these matters it is assumed the desired ones also — tend to be replaced by maleficent ones. If youth is led to sympathize in his

feeling, as well as in his intellect, with the well-dressed, the powerful, and in some respects the heroic actors who are loose in their morals, why shall we not expect him to accept the moral standards along with those of other conduct? It is far easier to yield to temptations that immediately gratify the natural appetites and return coarse pleasures when there are few and weak inhibitions than it is to overcome difficult obstacles and to achieve ultimate satisfactions and greatness or goodness. Realizing these facts and knowing that conduct is influenced to a much greater extent by the mores than by law or by appeals to reason, we should consider if we are not likely to reap a whirlwind because of the influence of the pictured drama that associates daily in every section of the country, to spectators from infancy up through the impressionable ages, unconventional and maleficent mores with other things generally considered desirable. Here is a matter with which education must concern itself or mischievous results, already recognized but seldom attributed to their probable cause, will materially modify the moral standards of our society.

Education is interested. — Education is interested, then, not merely in the mores and their intelligent evaluation in terms of societal welfare, but also in the means of modifying them, of adapting the good ones more closely to satisfying modern needs, and further-

more in building up an emotionalized attitude of respect for those that are good and of contempt for all others. The first step in any procedure is consciousness of what the mores are. Clearly seen, each one may then be considered in relation to its source and its effect. That education may be given in this important matter there is need, first of all, for an inventory of the mores of the more important social and political groups of our civilization. What are the "ways of doing things" generally accepted and unquestioningly followed by the great majority of the more important groups, ways the violation of which, consciously or unconsciously, brings in varying degrees social disapprobation? Perhaps it would be profitable to students of society to turn aside long enough from investigations of the mores of primitive and other strange people to list those that are effective amongst ourselves or to popularize amongst schoolmen such studies as have been made.

Education is concerned primarily with selecting from the inventory such mores as are judged of most worth to society on the ground that they have sound bases, or are of most concern to the individual because they are so deeply rooted that no reasonable amount of effort is likely to eradicate or materially to modify them and therefore they must be followed. Then for the more intelligent fraction of the population conviction of worth may lead to more consistent practice,

which will result not only in satisfactions but also in approving emotionalized attitudes that will tend to influence others. The study of science and of economics has already had obvious results in this respect. It is postulated that it would be even more successful if youth were made conscious of the resultant and desired mores. Doubtless the less intelligent fraction of the population can be affected somewhat by this means; but for the most part they will be led to adopt desired mores through imitation and through ritual. If the importance of the mores is recognized, there results another challenge to curriculum makers: to select by the combined judgment of the wise the mores which are important for economy, for unity, and for successful living in modern democratic society, and to devise means that may secure for them intelligent approval, emotional support, and consistency of practice.

Variation in mores. — Consideration of even a small number of current mores shows that they vary in reasonableness and in respectability. Consequently we may conclude that there are some which, enabling us economically "to satisfy needs without pain," we should follow and teach our youth to follow. There are others, however, that appear to be irrational, futilely persistent, and even mischievous to present-day societal welfare. These education, formal or informal, should somewhere seek to extirpate

or to modify. The mores of courtesy and respect toward women may be cited as an illustration of the former class; the rapidly passing mores of superstition, as an illustration of the latter. That the mores are modifiable is shown not so much by Sumner's statements that they "seem to grow up, gain strength, become corrupt, decline, and die"¹ as by our recall of ridiculous and even outrageous practices which they formerly approved but to-day condemn. Illustrations are fashions of dress and of manners, Puritan blue laws, human slavery, humor at insanity, deformity, and drunkenness, and subservience before hereditary nobility. We are concerned not so much, however, with modification of the mores of large groups, though intellectual leaders assuredly do have this responsibility, as with the selection of those which should be stamped into the habits with emotionalized approval of plastic youth. They do acquire mores of some kinds, mores that are permanently effective for character good or bad. It is the concern of education, considered in its larger sense, to select and seriously to teach those that are considered beneficent.

Modification of the mores. — How may the mores be modified? In the past, especially by primitive peoples but most assuredly not by them alone, the mores of others have been modified by force. War has always been the immediate weapon to compel

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 78.

others to act "properly," that is, as the more powerful do. Offensive mores may cause war directly, as to make others conform in religious rites or to abandon slavery, or indirectly, first developing such hostile emotionalized attitudes that trivial causes are so exaggerated as to lead to conflict. It may be noted, however, that not infrequently some of the mores of the conquered prevail over those of the conquerors, especially if the latter occupy the country of the former. The Goths took on many Roman customs after overrunning Italy, and even loyal men of the North changed somewhat their attitude toward the negro after the Civil War.

Modification of the mores by force takes many forms other than conflict by arms. It may be attempted by law. This means is successful only when there is overwhelming sentiment behind it: polygamy was abolished among the Mormons only because of overwhelming opposing social mores of the enveloping and more potent group; the negro has been largely disenfranchised in the South despite the constitutional amendment, which was supported by the mores of the North; and because of divided sentiment the success of the laws prohibiting alcoholic beverages is still in doubt. "The legalistic aspect of protecting property rights in slaves," writes A. S. Will, "and of the definition of the powers of the States, under the Federal Constitution, was not popularly considered with any-

thing like awe, as witness the outburst against the Dred Scott decision. The dictum of Taney was like a wisp of the wind compared to the cyclone of feeling aroused by Uncle Tom's Cabin."

Modification may result from business boycott: the Jew or the Klansman or the woman of loose chastity cannot in certain communities make an honest living. It may result from ridicule, "an assault on vanity, one of the most sensitive of human traits." The freshman changes his dress, may give up prayer, or conceals his love for poetry because the mores of his college lead to ridicule of his former practice and attitude. But most potent in our civilization is the manifest social disapprobation of the group with which one desires to affiliate. The individual changes his dress, his manners, his attitudes, and even his ways of thinking under pressure of his fellows. Thus much good teaching in classrooms is negated by the mores of the group, which far too frequently are ignored or despised by the teacher. Only the rarest and strongest personality makes the mores of his own group prevail over those of his pupils; when successful, he is likely to recognize the mores that his pupils hold and to attempt gradual modification of them.

Probably the majority of mores are negative, prohibitions rather than sanctions. Certainly violation of the negative mores results as a rule in more emotional group resentment. It is unmanly to enjoy

poetry rather than manly to read prose; the freshman may not wear colored ties or smoke on the campus, rather than is compelled to be respectful to upper classmen; a woman may not violate the mores of chastity. Dissatisfaction with the negative mores must be felt strongly, reasons must be overwhelmingly convincing before competing mores, especially those that are positive in nature, can prevail. The negative have an immense support in inertia and in superstition. This further explains many failures on the part of teachers, who often attempt to supplant poor negative mores with better positive ones. Probably the easier method would be to begin the attack on poor negative mores with better negative ones.

Possibility of modifying the mores is chiefly due to the fact that in a society such as ours there are many competing ways of doing things. By wisely directed effort the better may be made to prevail over the worse; selection of one set may cause another to die through disuse; adaptation of poor and partly effective ones may make them respectable and satisfactory; intelligent consideration may lead to a consistency hitherto unknown.¹ But new and desired mores are

¹ "Disagreement over this or that detail of the code does not become serious if all parties value the major provisions of the code. One of the chief utilities of otherwise inane and trite exhortations to patriotism and loyalty is that, by reiteration of these, the broad essentials of the common code and the need of supporting it are kept before people whose conflicting minor interests normally fill their

likely to prevail only as they are seen to give such satisfaction as to furnish for them favoring emotionalized attitudes.

A program proposed. — In summary, then, may be proposed a program for using the mores as a factor in the larger education. The details are all theoretical, needing and inviting criticism and especially experimentation.

First, an inventory should be made of the mores of the several groups of which the children to be educated are members.

Second, the mores should be evaluated as to their desirability for societal and for individual welfare and happiness, consideration being given to the dispersion among groups and to the potency of both those disapproved and those approved. This evaluation is a delicate matter, for there are involved many factors, such as the interrelation of one set of mores, perhaps undesirable, with others which give general satisfaction, even if on a low level. An effective set of established good mores may be well worth perpetuating, though ideal better ones are conceived.

Third, means must be found, invented, and tried of modifying the mores of a group and of teaching the young to accept the desirable ones in attitude

horizons. They are made to realize that they and their interests are but part of a larger whole whose importance is of the greatest. . . ." Keller, *op. cit.*, pp. 81 ff.

and in action and to replace the bad with the good.

The following means are proposed as worthy of consideration and experimentation:

1. *Force*. — As in the family and especially in the gang, the members are compelled to act and at least verbally to express themselves in certain ways.

2. *Approval and disapproval by the group of which the individual is or desires to be a member*. — Certainly a consciousness, which may easily be secured, of approval or of disapproval, is likely to add to the effectiveness of this means. There are possibilities here of making better groups desired and of securing by the individual entrance on probation. To the extent to which the group is desired and to which the individual is conscious of the mores held by them, he is likely to follow them.

3. *Ritual*.¹ — This term is here used, as by Sumner, to include the formal, even though not ceremonial, ways of doing things in any group. So conceived, it suggests a large number of details of the mores.

4. *Intellectual justification of the desired mores*. — It is postulated that this means is likely to be effective in proportion to the superiority of intellect. But all, the genius as well as the normal person and the dullard, need also the support of feeling.

¹ See page 103.

5. *Strengthening of the better of two competing mores.* — This may be both intellectual and emotional.

6. *Analysis of a complex ideal.* — This is necessary in order that youth may discriminate the essential good mores from the non-essential, incidental, or detrimental bad ones.

7. *Modification rather than replacement.* — It is postulated that it is easier to modify an existing set of mores toward betterment than it is to replace them with others that are quite different.

8. *Beginning with the negative.* — Again it is postulated that human nature is more easily led to resent and not to do than it is to approve and to do. Fortunately nearly all ideals may be stated negatively as well, or nearly as well, as positively.

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